B.S.E.S. vs Banwari Lal

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), is directed against order dated 19.10.2002, passed by District Forum (East), Saini Enclave, Delhi in Complaint Case No. 79/2002 entitled - Shri Banwari Lal v. Executive Engineer, Delhi Vidyut Board, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the above mentioned appeal, lie in a narrow compass. THE respondent Shri Banwari Lal had filed a complaint before the District Forum under Section 12 of the Act averring therein that he was a consumer, having electricity connection, bearing No. 602-1282639, installed at L-35/34, ground floor, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi for domestic purposes. It was stated in the complaint, filed by the respondent, that the appellant had levied misuse charges in respect of the above said electricity connection without issuing any notice in accordance with law. It was prayed in the complaint, filed by the respondent, that the levy of the misuse charges which was illegal, be directed to be cancelled and the appellant be directed to issue a revised bill. THE respondent had also claimed compensation and cost of litigation. The claim of the respondent in the District Forum was resisted by the appellant and in the reply/written version, filed on behalf of the appellant, it was stated that the Meter Reader at the time of meter reading in June, 1988 noticed misuse of electricity connection and on the basis of the report of the Meter Reader misuse charges had been levied by the appellant. It was stated that the misuse charges had been levied correctly by the appellant and that the complaint, filed by the respondent, deserved to be dismissed.

The learned District Forum vide impugned order has allowed the complaint, filed by the respondent, and has directed the appellant to issue a revised bill after removing the misuse charges and late payment charges. It has also been directed by the learned District Forum vide impugned order that in case after the issue of revised bills any amount is found to have been paid in excess by the respondent then the same be refunded to the respondent with interest @ 12% p.a. and in case as a result of the revision of the bill of any amount is payable by the respondent to the appellant, the same be accepted by the appellant from the respondent in five monthly instalments. The learned District Forum has also awarded a compensation of Rs. 2,000/- together with cost of litigation, amounting to Rs. 500/-.

FEELING aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at length, on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, a person, aggrieved by an order, made by the District Forum, can prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, proviso to Section 15 of the Act provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the above said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the above said period. The words ''sufficient cause'', occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'', though deserves to receive a liberal interpretation, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though, no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case, yet, again, as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied.

ADMITTEDLY, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of 30 days because the order being impugned in the present proceedings was passed by the learned District Forum on 19.10.2002 and the present appeal has been filed by the appellant on 28.1.2003. Therefore, the question requiring consideration at the very threshold is as to whether the appellant has shown ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the appeal, in time, within the meaning of proviso to Section 15 of the Act. The appellant along with the appeal has filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. The reasons for not filing the present appeal in time have been stated in para 1 of the above said application which reads as under : "That since the certified copy of the order was received on 18.11.2002, the last date of filing of present appeal in terms of original order was dated 18.12.2002. Since inadvertently, the copy of order dated 18.11.2002 was misplaced, another duplicate certified copy was got issued on 23.1.2003 after when the appellant came to know about the orders in terms of corrigendum dated 14.1.2003."

On a bare perusal of the contents of the above para, it is apparent that the reason assigned for not filing the appeal in time is the inadvertent misplacement of the certified copy of the order which was received by the appellant on 18.11.2002 which by no stretch of imagination can be treated or termed as ''sufficient cause'' within the meaning of proviso to Section 15 of the Act. Moreover, there is no affidavit of the concerned functionary of the appellant who alleged to have misplaced the certified copy of the order received on 18.11.2002. Delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity. Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercising such discretion by the appellate authority. In our above views we stand fortified by a decision of the Hon''ble National Commission in case Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, reported as III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-96 CONSUMER 2731 (NS).

IN view of the position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words ''sufficient cause'', it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence on the part of the appellant. IN our opinion, in the given facts, the appellant has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay and, therefore, the application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal, is hereby rejected.

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation, is also devoid of substance on merits because on a perusal of the impugned order, it is apparent that it has been held by the learned District Forum that before the levy of misuse charges no notice as provided under law was issued by the appellant. Even in the memorandum and grounds of appeal not a word has been stated about the issue of notice by the appellant to the respondent before the levy of misuse charges. In the absence of any notice before the levy of misuse charges, the action taken by the appellant in levying misuse charges, decidedly cannot sustain the test of judicial scrutiny. THE order, being impugned in the present proceedings, as a matter of fact, is a well-reasoned order which suffers from no infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Commission in exercise of its appellate powers. Thus, viewed from all angles, the present appeal, filed by the appellant, is devoid of substance. The same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.