DELHI VIDYUT BOARD vs Krishan Lal

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') is directed against order dated 6.10.1999, passed by District Forum No. IV (Nand Nagri) in Complaint Case No. 242/98 - entitled Sh. Krishan Lal v. Delhi Vidyut Board.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated are that the respondent Sh. Krishan Lal had filed a complaint before the District Forum averring that he was a consumer in respect of electricity connection bearing K. No. 601-135-615 which was sanctioned for domestic purposes. THE grievance of the respondent in the complaint filed by him in nutshell was that the appellant Delhi Vidyut Board had levied misuse charges without serving a proper legal notice on the respondent. It was prayed that the appellant be directed to issue a revised bill adjusting therein the excessive payments made by the respondent to the appellant. The claim of the respondent in the District Forum was resisted by the appellant. The stand taken by the appellant in the District Forum was that misuse charges on the respondent were levied on the basis of a report submitted by the meter reader, who noticed that the electricity supply was being misused for commercial purposes. It was also stated that a notice was served on the respondent and as no reply was received the misuse charges were levied on the respondent. It was stated in the written statement/written version filed on behalf of the appellant that the complaint filed by the respondent, deserved to be dismissed with costs.

The learned District Forum vide impugned order has allowed the complaint, filed by the respondent and has held that the appellant had levied misuse tariff on the respondent without serving proper legal notice and on the basis of the above findings has directed the appellant to issue a revised bill adjusting therein the excess payment received by the appellant from the respondent. The appellant has also been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 500/- by way of costs to the respondent.

FEELING aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, a person aggrieved by an order, made by the District Forum, can prefer an appeal against such an order to the State Commission within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, proviso to Section 15 of the Act provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the abovesaid period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the abovesaid period. The words ''sufficient cause'', occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'', though deserves to receive a liberal interpretation, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though, no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case, yet, again, as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied.

ADMITTEDLY, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of 30 days because the order being impugned in the present proceedings was passed by the learned District Forum on 6.10.1999 where-as the present appeal has been filed in this Commission on 25.1.2000. Therefore, the question requiring consideration at the very threshold is as to whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time, within the meaning of proviso to Section 15 of the Act. The appellant, alongwith the appeal, has also filed an application, seeking condonation of delay, in filing the appeal. The reasons for not filing the appeal in time have been stated in para 2 of the abovesaid application and the same reads as under : "That there is some delay in filing the present appeal which is due to the processing of the case and records. The delay is neither deliberate nor intentional. It occurred due to circumstances beyond the control of the appellant. The delay deserved to be condone by the Hon''ble Commission."

(underlined by us) On a perusal of the contents of the above para, it is apparent that the reason assigned for not filing the appeal in time is ''processing of the case and records''. As a matter of fact the reason assigned by the appellant for not filing the appeal in time is no reason in the eyes of law. In the above context, the following observations of the National Commission in case Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-96 CONSUMER 2731 (NS), are utmost significance : "Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion. It was the duty of the DDA to establish as to how the matter was dealt with at all levels and each day''s delay had to be satisfactorily explained. Inter office consultation for prolonged periods cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The delay cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity because the process of working in D.D.A. has resulted in the delay."

(Emphasis supplied)

THE above decision of the Apex Commission virtually clinches the matter finally and in the presence of the facts already stated and the position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words ''sufficient cause'', it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence or want of bona fides on the part of the appellant. In our opinion, as a matter of fact, in the given facts, the appellant has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay and, therefore, the application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal, is hereby rejected.

THE present appeal filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation, is also devoid of substance of merits because the impugned order is based on the findings of the learned District Forum that misuse charges were levied without serving proper legal notice upon the respondent. THE ground taken by the appellant in the appeal is that notice was served on the respondent before levying misuse charges. We with a view to satisfy ourselves directed the appellant to produce before us the proof of service of such a notice on the respondent. Despite sufficient opportunity being given to the appellant no such proof of the service of the notice on the respondent was either placed on record or produced before us for our perusal. In the presence of the above facts, in our opinion, on merits also, the present appeal, filed by the appellant, is devoid of substance. Thus, viewed from all angles, the present appeal, filed by the appellant, is devoid of substance. The same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed in limine.