B.S.E.S. YAMUNA POWER LIMITED vs B.R.Verma

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to the ''the Act''), is directed against order dated 4.12.2002, passed by District Forum (East), Saini Enclave, Delhi in Complaint Case No. 127/2002 - entitled Shri B.R. Verma v. Central East Delhi Electricity Distribution Company Ltd.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent Shri B.R. Verma had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act before the District Forum averring therein that the respondent was a member of a Group Housing Society, namely, Nav Rachna Group Housing Society. It was stated that the above said society had deposited a sum of Rs. 11,90,825/- with the appellant for the installation of a Sub-Station in the society and an application for individual connection was also filed by the respondent for which the respondent had deposited a sum of Rs. 1,770/- on 28.2.2001 and had also paid a sum of Rs. 150/- for the purpose of line testing report. It was stated that electricity to the said Society was provided at a higher tariff and instead of installing individual connection, a raid was conducted on the premises of the respondent on 4.7.2001. It was stated that thereafter on 10.7.2001, a notice was served on the respondent asking the respondent to deposit a sum of Rs. 9,907/- and on 16.7.2001 a new meter was installed by the functionaries of the appellant. It was stated that the electricity supply was restored on 16.7.2001 but the meter was defective and on the next date, a new meter was installed in the premises of the respondent. It was stated that the Society had filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Delhi which was decided by the learned Civil Judge vide order dated 15.3.2000 directing the appellant to accept the dues in six equal monthly instalments and to provide temporary connections to individual residents within 15 days of the deposit of the first instalment by the Society and on completion of formalities by the residents. In the complaint, filed by the respondent, it was prayed that directions be issued to the appellant to provide electricity on normal tariff, to return the old sub-meter which was installed by the respondent at his own cost and to refund the amount of Rs. 9,907/- deposited by him. THE respondent had also claimed compensation and cost of litigation. The appellant did not care to defend the complaint in the District Forum and the learned District Forum vide impugned order has directed the appellant to instal individual connection in the name of the respondent in the premises in his occupation on completion of formalities. The learned District Forum has also quashed the bill/demand raised on the basis of the raid conducted on 4.7.2001 for the reason that the respondent was already having electricity and was being charged at a higher tariff on temporary connection. The learned District Forum also directed that a revised bill be issued on the tariff as applicable without adding late payment surcharge. It has been directed that the amount received in excess of the revised bill be adjusted in future bills. The learned District Forum has also awarded a compensation of Rs. 2,000/- and another sum of Rs. 500/- as cost of litigation.

Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act.

WE have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, a person, aggrieved by an order, made by the District Forum, can prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, proviso to Section 15 of the Act provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the above said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the above said period. The words ''sufficient cause'' occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'', though deserves to receive a liberal interpretation, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which meaans the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though, no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a gien case, yet again, as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied. Admittedly, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of 30 days because the order being impugned in the present proceedings was passed by the learned District Forum on 4.12.2002 and the present appeal has been filed by the appellant on 4.2.2003. Therefore, the question requiring consideration on the threshold is as to whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time within the meaning of proviso to Section 15 of the Act.

THE appellant, along with the appeal has filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. THE reason for not filing the appeal in time has been stated in para 1 of the above said application which reads as under : "1. That since the certified copy of the order was received on 17.12.2002, the last date of filing of present appeal in terms of original order dated 16.1.2003. Since the concerned department of the DVB could forward the papers pertaining to the case only in the last week of January, 2003, panel Advocate could prepare the appeal only on 3.2.2003."

On a perusal of the contents of the above para it is apparent that certified true copy of the order being impugned in the present proceedings was received by the appellant on 17.12.2002 and if the period of limitation for filing the appeal is to be computed, as commencing from the date of communication of the order, as has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in case Housing Board, Haryana v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association & Ors., reported as III (1995) CPJ 28 (SC), the present appeal should have been filed on 16.1.2003. The same, as already stated, has been filed much beyond the prescribed period of limitation on 4.2.2003. The reason assigned for not filing the appeal in time is that the concerned department of the appellant could forward the papers pertaining to the case to the panel lawyer of the appellant only in the last week of January, 2003. It is nowhere stated as to why the papers could not be forwarded by the concerned department to the lawyer for filing the appeal in time. Only a bald statement has been made to the above effect that the concerned department of the appellant could forward the papers pertaining to the present case to the panel lawyer in the last week of January, 2003 which by no stretch of imagination can be treated or termed as ''sufficient cause'' within the meaning of proviso to Section 15 of the Act. Delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity. Proof of ''sufficient cause'' is a condition precedent for the exercise of such discretion by the Appellate Authority. In our above views, we stand fortified by a decision of the Hon''ble National Commission in case Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, reported as III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-96 COnSUMER-2731 (NS). In the presence of the above facts and the position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words ''sufficient cause'' it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence on the part of the appellant. In our opinion, as a matter of fact, the appellant has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal and, therefore, the present appeal, is hopelessly barred by limitation.

ON a perusal of the order being impugned in the present proceedings, it is apparent that the appellant did not care to defend the case before the District Forum. We, during the course of hearing, have put a specific query to the learned Counsel for the appellant as to why the matter was not defended on behalf of the appellant in the District Forum and no satisfactory reply to our query could be given by the learned Counsel for the appellant. We really fail to understand that having chosen not to defend its case before the District Forum what is the justification on the part of the appellant in agitating the matter before the Court of Appeal. As already stated, no satisfactory explanation could be given by the learned Counsel for the appellant as to why the appellant did not care to defend the matter before the District Forum in case the defence of the appellant was genuine. The only inference which could be drawn from the above fact is that now a vain attempt is being made by the appellant by filing the present appeal.

THUS, viewed from all angles, the present appeal, filed by the appellant is devoid of substance. The same deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no orders as to costs. Appeal dismissed.