DELHI VIDYUT BOARD vs GOPI RAM

THE present appeal filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), is directed against order dated the 6th December, 1999, passed by District Forum (North-West) in Complaint Case No. 584/98 entitled Shri Gopi Ram v. THE Executive Engineer, Delhi Vidyut Board &Ors.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent Shri Gopi Ram had filed a complaint before the District Forum under Section 12 of the Act with the allegations that the meter installed at his premises bearing Electric Connection No. K. No. SB-505-139003-4102-DL, was not working properly as a result of which, he was getting inflated bills in respect of the abovesaid electricity connection for September, 1997; March, 1998; May, 1998; and June, 1998. It was stated in the complaint that the respondent had made an application for the replacement of meter on 24.6.1998 but the meter was changed by the appellant only in August, 1998. It was prayed by the respondent in the complaint that the old meter be checked /replaced and on the basis of the results, the bills in question be quashed and fresh bills be raised in respect of the period in question. THE respondent also requested that the appellant be directed to pay to the respondent a compensation of Rs. 10,000/- for mental agony and harassment together with cost of litigation amounting to Rs. 5,000/-. The claim of the respondent in the District Forum, was resisted by the appellant. The stand taken by the appellant was that the bills in question had already been revised and a credit of Rs. 1,029/- had already been given to the respondent as a result of the revision of the bills. It was stated by the appellant, in the reply/ written version, that old meter installed at the premises of the respondent could not be tested as the respondent had not deposited the requisite fees.

The learned District Forum, vide impugned order, has held that there was deficiency in service on the part of the appellant and on the basis of the above findings, has passed the order, being impugned in the present proceedings.

FEELING aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, a person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum can prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, proviso to Section 15 of the Act provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the abovesaid period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the abovesaid period. The words ''sufficient cause'', occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'', though deserves to receive a liberal interpretation, yet a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though, no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case, yet again, as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied.

ADMITTEDLY, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of 30 days because the order being impugned in the present proceedings was passed by the learned District Forum on 6.12.1999 and the present appeal has been filed in this Commission on 7.3.2000. Therefore, the question requiring consideration at the very threshold is as to whether the appellant has shown ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the appeal in time, within the meaning of proviso to Section 15 of the Act. The appellant alongwith the appeal, has filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The reasons for not filing the appeal in time have been stated in paras 2 and 3 of the abovesaid application and the same reads as under: "That the said orders were passed on 6.12.1999 and the certified copy of the said orders were prepared on 24.12.1999. The said orders were received by the legal department on 29.12.1999. The said file was forwarded to Deputy Chief Legal Officer-II for approval. On 10th January, 2000 the approval was granted and the file was sent to A.L.O.-VIII for further action. On 11.1.2000 the Legal Assistant was called upon to write to the Executive Engineer of the concerned district to send the grounds of appeal. Due to certain unavoidable circumstances, the grounds of appeal could not be sent back to the legal department till yet. In order to avoid further delay, the concerned Lawyer is preferring appeal on the basis of pleadings and documents available to her. That since D.V.B. is a big organisation and is not just a single individual, such delay is generally beyond control and such delay is neither intentional nor deliberate."

(Underlined by us) On a perusal of the contents of the above paras, it is apparent that certified copy of the order, being impugned, was received by the appellant on 29.12.1999 itself and thereafter the file was forwarded to the Deputy Chief Legal Officer-II for approval on 10.1.2000. The approval was granted and the file was sent to ALO-VIII for further action. On 11.1.2000, the Legal Assistant was called upon to write to the concerned Executive Engineer to send grounds of appeal which have not been received till the filing of appeal and the Lawyer has preferred the present appeal without receiving information from the concerned Executive Engineer on the basis of pleadings and documents available with her. Can there be a more worse example of negligence than the present one ? Moreover no explanation, whatsoever, for delay has been given in the abovesaid application after 11.1.2000 till the date of filing the appeal except that it is stated in the application that the appellant is a ''big organisation'' and not just a ''single individual''. In the above context, the following observations of the National Commission in case Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-96 CONSUMER 2731 (NS), are of utmost significance : "Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion. It was the duty of the D.D.A. to establish as to how the matter was dealt with at all levels and each day''s delay had to be satisfactorily explained. Inter office consultation for prolonged periods cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The delay cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity because the process of working in D.D.A. has resulted in the delay."

(Emphasis supplied) The above decision of the Apex Commission virtually clinches the matter finally and in the presence of the facts already stated and the position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words ''sufficient cause'', it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence or want of bona fides on the part of the appellant. In our opinion, as a matter of fact, in the given facts, the appellant has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay and therefore, the application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal, is hereby rejected.

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation, is also devoid of substance on merits because as already stated by us it has been held by the learned District Forum that there was deficiency in service on the part of the appellant. THE stand taken by the appellant before the District Forum, was that the old meter installed at the residence of the respondent could not be tested as the respondent had not deposited the requisite fees. On the above point we made a specific query to the learned Counsel for the appellant as to when the appellant asked the respondent to deposit the fees in question and to our above query, no satisfactory reply could be given by the learned Counsel for the appellant. On the material on record also, there is nothing on record to substantiate the above contention of the appellant. Thus, viewed from all angles, the present appeal, filed by the appellant, is devoid of substance. THE same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.

THE appeal stands disposed of in above terms. Appeal dismissed in limine.