Kewal Krishan vs The Government Food Inspector and Another

S.S. Grewal, J.—This petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) relates to quashment of complaint filed by the Food Inspector (Respondent No. 1) for prosecution of the Petitioner concerning commission of an offence u/s 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the consequent proceedings taken there under.

In brief fact relevant for the disposal of this petition as emerge from the complaint (Annexure P/1), are, that on 13th March, 1985, at about 11.30 A.M. Shri Balbir Singh, Food Inspector went to the premises of the present Petitioner and after duly taking sample of corroborated water lemon meant for sale, as required under the relevant Rules,, sent one sealed bottle to the Public Analyst along with copy of memorandum in form VII in a sealed packet. As per report of the Public Analyst the contents of the sample contained suspended matter and were contaminated with coloform bacteria. The contents also contained tartrazinea coaltar food colour without label declaration as required under Rules 24 and 32 of the relevant Rules, 1955.

The learned Counsel for the parties were heard.

In view of the Single Bench authority of this Court in Nirmal Singh v. Union Territory Chandigarh 1990 (2) C.C.C (HC) 111, the objection taken by the Petitioner that the Food Inspector in the instant case was not appointed by the appropriate Government u/s 9(1) of the Act, or that the prosecution was not launched, or, initiated by a person duly authorised to do so u/s 21 of the Act was not pressed. It was mainly submitted on behalf of the Petitioner that the trial against the Petitioner commenced before the trial Court on 16th April, 1985 after the Food Inspector filed the complaint in the trial Court and that the said trial has not been yet completed and that the same has been unnecessarily prolonged for six years resulting in miscarriage of justice and denial of inherent right of speedy trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Reliance in this respect has rightly been placed on Full Bench authority of Patna High Court in Madheshwardhari Singh and Another Vs. State of Bihar, , wherein it was held that the right of a speedy public trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution. It has further been ruled that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which was not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones, plainly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The inordinate delay in completion of trial in the instant case has occurred mainly due to the negligence on the part of the trial Court which erred in following warrant procedure instead of following the procedure meant for summary trial, without passing any specific order that the nature of the case was such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ought to have been passed, or, that for any other reason it was undesirable to try the case summarily as contemplated under proviso 1 and 2 to Section-16(2) of the Act which came into force on 1st April, 1976 much before the impugned complaint was filed in the trial Court. Thus pendency of Criminal proceedings for the last six years certainly amounts not only to miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the Court but also amounts to negation of fundamental right of speedy trial to which the Petitioner was entitled under Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly when the allegations in the instant case merely amount to technical offence under the Act and the Rules framed there under. I find support in my view from the Single Bench authority of this Court in Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana (3).

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint Annexure P/1 and the resultant proceedings pending in the trial Court against the Petitioner are hereby quashed. This petition is accordingly allowed.