Dhurub Kumar vs State Of Jharkhand

Rajesh Shankar, J.

I.A. No.5584 of 2025:

The present interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 439 days in filing the instant letters patent appeal.

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the writ petition being W.P.(S) No.1317 of 2022 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 21st November, 2023. The said fact could not be informed by the counsel to the appellant due to which he was under impression that the said writ petition was pending before the High Court. On 20th January, 2025, the appellant enquired from his counsel about status of the case upon which he was informed that the writ petition was already dismissed on 21st November, 2023 and he was not able to inform the said fact to the appellant, as his contact number was deleted from his mobile phone.

It is further submitted that the appellant is an old and ailing person and was being regularly treated by the local doctors. This was also the reason, which attributed in delayed filing of the instant letters patent appeal, challenging the order dated 21st November, 2023 passed in W.P.(S) No.1317 of 2022.

Learned counsel for the appellant also submits that having come to know about dismissal of the writ petition, the appellant reached Ranchi on 21st January, 2025; collected all documents from his earlier counsel; engaged a new counsel; and got the instant appeal filed on 4th March, 2025. The time consumed between 21st January, 2025 till filing of the instant appeal i.e. 4th March, 2025 was due to the reason that the appellant waited till 3rd March, 2025 for want of certified copy of the impugned order.

Learned counsel for the respondents submits that there is inordinate delay of 439 days in filing the instant letters patent appeal. The appellant has not assigned any cogent reason in the present interlocutory application so as to condone such a huge delay.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the contents of the present interlocutory application.

The writ petition being W.P.(S) No.1317 of 2022 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 21st November, 2023, whereas the instant appeal was filed on 4th March, 2025 and, therefore, there is delay of 439 days in preferring the same.

The ground taken by the appellant that he being an old and ailing person was under regular treatment of local doctors and due to the said reason, he could not contact his counsel so as to enquire about status of the writ petition does not appear to be a satisfactory explanation.

On perusal of the copies of the prescriptions annexed with the present interlocutory application, it appears that the appellant was not suffering from any such serious ailment which could have prevented him from enquiring the status of the writ petition from his counsel. Otherwise also, it is the duty of the litigant to be vigilant about the case pending before the Court of Law.

According to the appellant, he enquired about the matter from his counsel on 20th January, 2025 i.e. after expiry of more than a year of dismissal of the writ petition, which itself suggests that there is serious laches on the part of the appellant.

The statement made in the present interlocutory application that the appellant after approaching his counsel on 21st January, 2025 collected all the documents and engaged a new counsel to prefer the present letters patent appeal and waited till 3rd March, 2025 for want of certified copy of the impugned order dated 21st November, 2023 also appears to be incorrect. In fact, the present letters patent appeal was filed on 4th March, 2025 with photostat copy of the impugned order dated 21st November, 2023 passed in W.P.(S) No.1317 of 2022 and after filing of the same, requisition for obtaining certified copy of the impugned order was made on 11th March, 2025, which was made available to him on 19th March, 2025. Therefore, the said ground taken by the appellant, seeking condonation of delay in filing the present letters patent appeal, appears to be contrary to record.

In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2014)11 SCC 351, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

“6. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained everyday by the courts. The law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim [(1939-40) 67 IA 416 : (1941) 53 LW 212 : AIR 1941 PC 6] , relied upon the writings of Mr Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 wherein it has been said that : (IA p. 426)

A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law.

In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556 : AIR 1998 SC 2276] , the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held as under : (SCC p. 558, para 6)

“6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.”

The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.”

Under the aforesaid circumstance, we are of the view that the appellant has not shown sufficient cause in the present interlocutory application to condone the inordinate delay of 439 days in preferring the instant letters patent appeal. Hence, we are not inclined to condone the said delay.

I.A. No.5584 of 2025 is, accordingly, dismissed.

L.P.A. No.233 of 2025:

Resultantly, present letters patent appeal is also dismissed.

Other pending I.As., if any, are also dismissed.