Soni Devi vs State Of Jharkhand

Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

The instant civil review has been filed for review the order  dated  05.01.2023  passed  by  the  Division  Bench  of  this Court in L.P.A. No. 346 of 2016, whereby and whereunder, the letters patent appeal has been dismissed on limitation.

I.A. No. 12408 of 2024:

The instant civil review is admittedly barred by limitation since there is delay of 403 days in preferring the review, therefore, an application being I.A. No. 12408 of 2024 has been filed for condoning such delay.

This  Court,  after taking  into consideration the fact  that the instant civil review has been field after inordinate delay of 403  days,  deems  it  fit  and  proper,  to  first  consider  the  delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be sufficient.

The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the review, as has been mentioned in the interlocutory application at  paragraphs-6  &  7  is  that  the  petitioner  has  no  knowledge about the dismissal of LPA No. 346 of 2016 and when she inquired about her case, she came to know about the dismissal of her case.

The  ground  has  also  been  taken  that  the  appellant  then manage  the expeses  and  approached  the present counsel and then the instant review application was filed. As such, delay of 403 days has occurred in filing the instant civil review.

We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants on delay condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court  with  respect  to  the  approach  of  the  Court  in  condoning the inordinate delay.

There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.

It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has  been  held  in  the  judgment  rendered  by  the  Hon’ble  Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.

The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40)  67  IA  416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:

“A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.”

In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation  of  delay  had  been  given,  held  at  paragraph-6  as under:

“6.Law of limitation may harshly affect a  particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when  the  statute  so  prescribes  and  the courts  have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.”

While considering the  similar  issue,  this  Court  in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as under:

“21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant  factors  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  It  is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are  required  to  weigh  the  scale  of  balance  of  justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot  be  given  a  total  go-by  in  the  name  of  liberal approach.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

It is settled position of Law that when a  litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction  and  negligence  are  the  vital  factors  which  should  be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of  delay.  Reference  in this  regard  be  made  to  the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal  and  Chhotelal  Vrs.  Rewa  Coalfields  Ltd.,  (1962)  2 SCR 762, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-

“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even  after  sufficient  cause  has  been  shown  a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion  it  should  condone  the  delay.  This  aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection  we  may  point  out  that  considerations  of bona  fides  or  due  diligence  are  always  material  and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected  the  appellant's  application  for  condonation of  delay  only  on  the  ground  that  it  was  appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.

Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider  the  sufficient  cause  for  condonation  of  delay  as  also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary  to  look into  the  bona fide  motive  of  the  litigant  and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.

It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of‘sufficient  cause’  has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or“enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word“sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,“sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a  case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969)  2  SCC  770  : AIR  1970  SC  1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)

In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.

The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence,  inaction  or  lack  of  bona  fides  cannot  be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on  the  facts  of  a  particular  case  and  no  straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002)  1 SCC  535  : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)

It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation  may  harshly  affect  a  particular  party  but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision  is  never  an  evil.  A  court  has  no  power  to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress  resulting  from  its  operation.”  The  statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular  party  but  the  court  has  no  choice  but  to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that,“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been  agitated  unexplainably  and  have  from  lapse  of time  become  stale.  According  to Halsbury's  Laws  of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely,  (1)  that  long  dormant  claims  have  more  of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”

An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what  may  have  been  acquired  in  equity  and  justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005)  7 SCC  510]  , Rajender  Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]

In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002)  4 SCC  578  ] this  Court  held  that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].

The law on  the issue can be  summarised to the effect  that  where  a case  has  been  presented  in  the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason  which  prevented  him  to  approach  the  court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there  was  a  want  of  bona  fide  on  its  part  in  view  of  the  facts and  circumstances  of  a  case  or  it  cannot  be  alleged  that  the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow  the  application  for  condonation  of  delay.  The  Court  has to  examine  whether  the  mistake  is  bona  fide  or  was  merely  a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.

It  has  further  been  held  in  the  aforesaid  judgments  that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that  substantial justice is  done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment  rendered  by the Hon’ble Apex Court  in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-

“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression“sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute“sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished  for  the  delay  caused  in  taking  steps.  But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed  with  the  tendency  of  finding  fault  with  the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence  or  inaction  or  want  of  bona  fides  can  be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while  considering  the  matter  the  courts  should  not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the  time  prescribed  a  valuable  right  has  accrued  to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable  points  of  facts  and  law  are  involved  in  the case,  causing  enormous  loss  and  irreparable  injury to the party against  whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.”

It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein, expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner  or  there  was a  want of  bona fide  on  its  part in  view  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  a  case  or  it  cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.

This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition and the explanation furnished in the delay condonation application to condone the inordinate delay of 403 days, is proceeding to examine as to whether the explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient explanation for condoning the delay.

As would appear from the explanation furnished, wherein, it has been stated that the petitioner has no knowledge  about  the  dismissal  of  L.P.A.  No.  346  of  2016  and when she inquired about her case, she came to know about the dismissal of her case.

The  ground  has  also  been  taken  that  the  appellant  then manage the expenses and approached the present counsel and then the instant review application was filed.

This  Court,  therefore,  is  of  the  view  that  the  explanation which has been furnished by the petitioner in the delay condonation application, cannot be said to be a sufficient cause to condone the inordinate  delay reason  being that  the letters patent appeal being L.P.A. No. 346 of 2016 was dismissed on limitation on 05.01.2023 and taking the ground by the appellant for condonation of delay that she was not aware of the said order of dismissal and when she came to know about the same then, she approached her counsel to take further step, is not fit to be accepted.

Further, this Court is of the view that the said L.P.A. No. 346  of  2016  was  also  filed  after  the  inordinate  delay  of  2237 days  and  the  present  review  petition  has  also  been  filed  after the delay of 403 days which itself shows the callous and negligent approach of the petitioner towards her lis as the petitioner has also not taken steps to know the outcome of her appeal which cannot be said to be sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of 403 days.

This  Court,  therefore,  is  of  the  view  that  the  explanation which has been furnished by the appellant in the delay condonation application, cannot be said to be a sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay.

It needs to refer herein that the coordinate Bench of this Court has passed an order in L.P.A. No.86 of 2021 on 05.01.2022  rejecting  the  delay  condonation  application  since the appeal was filed after delay of about 687 days without any sufficient cause to condone the delay.

This  Court,  after  taking  into  consideration  the  ratio  laid by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove as also the explanation furnished in the delay condonation application, is of the view that no sufficient cause has been shown to condone inordinate delay of 403 days in filing the appeal.

Accordingly, the delay condonation application being I.A. No. 12408 of 2024 is hereby dismissed.

In consequence thereof, the instant appeal also stands dismissed and the pending interlocutory applications(s), if any, also stand dismissed.