Uday Kumar Singh vs State of Jharkhand

D.N. Patel, A.C.J

1. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 3235 days in preferring the

present Letters Patent Appeal, and this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single

Judge in writ petition being W.P.(S) No.371 of 2009, dated 30.01.2009.

2. Having heard counsel for the appellant, and looking to the reasons stated in paragraph no.5 onwards, it appears that after the aforesaid writ

petition was dismissed, though the appellant was well advised, as stated in para â€" 5 of this interlocutory application, no letters patent appeal was

preferred and unnecessarily time was wasted by this appellant. The golden thread running throughout the argument is that on the guidance of others

the appellant has taken wrong action. It is the prerogative power of this appellant that from whom he will obtain the guidance. He could have got

guidance from able person. In fact, the reasons given in this interlocutory application are not reasonable reasons for condonation of delay of 3235 days

in preferring the present Letters Patent Appeal, hence, I.A. No.5327 of 2018, is dismissed.

3. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 685, in paragraph

nos.25 and 26, which read as under :

“25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause†has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of

reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of

“reasonablenessâ€​ as it is understood in its general connotation.

The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be

adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one

party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take

away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party.

Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing

its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting

vigilantly.â€​        (Emphasis supplied)

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Cicily Kallarackal Vs. Cehicle Factory, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 524, in

paragraph nos.6, 7 and 8, which read as under :

“6. This Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. Noida has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the Special Courts/Tribunals

have been constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them.

Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the court must keep in mind the special period

of limitation prescribed under the statute(s).

7. In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this

Court in place of the period prescribed by the legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone

the delay.

8. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are

dismissed on the ground of delay.â€​        (Emphasis supplied)

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Londhe Prakash Bhagwan Vs. Dattatraya Eknath Mane, reported in (2013) 10

SCC 627, in paragraph no.9, which reads as under :

“9. Even if we assume that no limitation is prescribed in any statute to file an application before the court in that case, can an aggrieved person

come before the court at his sweet will at any point of time? The answer must be in the negative. If no time-limit has been prescribed in a statute to

apply before the appropriate forum, in that case, he has to come before the court within a reasonable time. This Court on a number of occasions, while

dealing with the matter of similar nature held that where even no limitation has been prescribed, the petition must be filed within a reasonable time. In

our considered opinion, the period of 9 years and 11 months, is nothing but an inordinate delay to pursue the remedy of a person and without submitting

any cogent reason therefor. The court has no power to condone the same in such case. (See Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory, State of Orissa v.

Mamata Mohanty and K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh.) In these cases, it has been held that the application should be rejected on the ground of inordinate

delay. Furthermore, it is to be noted that appointment of the appellant was within the knowledge of Respondent 1 from day one but he did not take any

step for such a long time.â€​        (Emphasis supplied)

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351, in

paragraph nos.6, 10, 11 and 15, which read as under :

“6. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained everyday by the courts. The

law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation).

Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively

fixed period of time.

10. The courts should not adopt an injustice-orientedapproach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the court while

allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would

deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the

court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly,

satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

11. It is also a well-settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the court just or immediately after the cause of action

had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the

impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person.

In the instant case, after considering the facts and circumstances and the reasons for inordinate delay of 10 years 2 months and 29 days, the High

Court did not find sufficient grounds to condone the delay.â€​      (Emphasis supplied)

7. Accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal is disposed of as barred by limitation.