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Judgment
THE question of limitation is involved in this appeal. THE complainant-respondent filed a complaint under Sec. 12 against the opposite party appellant which was registered as Complaint Case No. 417/90. THE opposite party-appellant resisted the complaint by filing a version of the case. THE District Forum after hearing the parties passed the impugned order on 28-12-1992 wherein certain directions were issued to the opposite party-appellant. Aggrieved the opposite party has filed the appeal under Sec. 15 of the Act on 22-2-93 against the order dated 26-12-92 passed by the District Forum Kota.
OFFICE reported that this appeal was presented 26 days after the expiry of the period of limitation. After perusing the application for condonation of delay notice was issued to the appellant/counsel to show cause as to why the appeal be not rejected as barred by time. In pursuance of that Mr. M.L. Vyas, learned Counsel for the appellant appeared. He was heard on the question of limitation on 25-9-93. The application for certified copy was made on 30-12-92. The date fixed for issuing the copy was 4-1-93. The copy was ready on 30-12-92. It was delivered on 4-1-93. The appellant is entitled to 5 days as time spent in obtaining the certified copy. OFFICE report that the appeal is barred by 26 days was not contested by the learned Counsel for the appellant. An application for condo nation delay was submitted with the memo of appeals Paras Nos. 1, 2,3 of the application read as follows : "1. That the order under appeal was passed by learned District Consumer Forum, Kota on 28-12-1992. An application to furnish a certified copy was submitted to the Court below on 30-12-1992 and the copy was delivered to the applicant on 4-1-1993. Papers to file appeal were forwarded from Kota to Jaipur. 2. That after due processing and examination, at the departmental level, matter was referred on 12-1-1993 to the Finance Department of the Government of Rajasthan for concurrence to file an appeal. The requisite sanction for the purpose was issued from Finance on 3-2-1993. The Law Department of the Government was also consulted, wherefrom Shri M.L. Vyas was appointed to prepare and file the appeal. OFFICEr Incharge received papers on 15-2-1993. That some time was consumed in collecting requisite material, and 2/3 days consumed in preparation, typing of the appeal and petition for condo nation and other formalities. In between on 19th and 21st February, 1993 there were public holidays. As such the appeal is being filed on 22-2-1993." 3. In support of the application for condonation of delay Shri Surendra Pal Singh. Dy, Director, Insurance and G.P.F. Secretariat, Jaipur submitted his affidavit. Paras 2 and 3 of the affidavit are as follows : - "2. That the annexed appeal and application for condonation of delay have been drafted under my instructions by the Counsel. I have read and understood the contents thereof fully and I admit them to be true and correct. 3. That the contents of the paras enumerated in the referred appeal and the application for condonation of delay are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and based on official record which I have perused and have satisfied myself to be true and correct."
The application for condonation of delay was filed under Sec. 15 of the Act read with Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act reads as follows : - "Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period."
THE appellant is required to explain each day of delay after the expiry of the period of limitation. As stated above the appellant is entitled to 30 days + 5 days (period prescribed for filing the appeal plus time spent in obtaining the certified copy). In these circumstances, we have to see whether the appellant has succeeded in explaining the delay of 25 days in presenting the appeal. THE crucial words used in proviso to Sec. 15 are ''sufficient cause'' and ''satisfied''. THEse words have also been used in Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act has to be given the same meaning which has been attributed thereto over a long line of precedents under Sec. 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 and its predecessor statute of 1988. It is clear from para 1 of the application that after obtaining the certified copy, the papers were forwarded for filing the appeal from Kota to Jaipur. Para 2 further shows that after due processing and examination at the departmental level, the matter was referred on 12-1-1993 to the Finance Department, Government of Rajasthan for concurrence for filing the appeal and the requisite sanction was issued for filing the appeal on 6-2-1993. Thus the period taken for obtaining sanction as per the averments made in para 2 of the application is from 12-1-93 to 6-2-1993. THEreafter Law Department was consulted and a Counsel was appointed who prepared the appeal on 15-2-93, 2-3 days were taken in preparing and typing the appeal. THEre were public holidays from 19th Feb. 93 to 21st Feb. 1993. This is wrong as February 20,93 was not a public holiday. Para 2 of the application is vague and is insufficient to explain the delay caused. It was incumbent on the appellant to satisfy the State Commission in regard to its sufficient cause as envisaged by proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act. In State of West Bengal v. THE Adniinistrator, Howrah Municipality and Others (A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 7) it was observed as under : "Mr. D. Mukerji, learned Counsel for the first respondent, is certainly well-founded in his contention that the expression "suffi- cient cause" cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the parity in default is the Government. It is no doubt true that whether it is a Government or a private party, the provisions of law applicable are the same, unless the statute itself makes any distinction..."
From the above, it is manifest that even a much larger bigger body like the State, be it the Central Government or a State Government is on no different footing than the private litigant for the purpose of condontion of delay against the bar of limitation. In the Bihar State Board of Religious Trust v. Ramashray Prasad Choudhary (A.I.R. 1977 Patna 272) it was held that the Bihar State Board of Religious Trust was not entitled to any different treatment than a private party. An autonomous Board or a Corporation being a much smaller and a compact body would obviously be even on a lower footing vis--vis the Central Government or the State Government. It is not entitled to any different treatment than a private party.
LEARNED Counsel appearing for the appellant has placed strong reliance on A.I.R. 1979 S.C 1666, AIR 1987 S.C. 1353 and A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 897. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1666 is with respect to Legal Advisor''s opinion. It was held that a mistake of Counsel in calculating period of limitation can be a sufficient cause and condonation cannot be refused on the ground that the Manager of Company is not an illiterate or so ignorant person, who could not calculate period of limitation. This authority is clearly distinguishable, as the facts in the appeal on hand are quite different and there is no question of the mistaken calculation of the period of limitation by the Counsel. So far as A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1353 is concerned it is a Division Bench judgment consisting of two Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court. One of the questions involved in that case was about the application for condonation of delay made by the State Government. In para 3 while considering the question it was held that the expression ''sufficient cause'' employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable tlie Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts and that a liberal approach in the matters instituted in the Supreme Court could be made. It laid down certain principles which have been enumerated at page 1354 of the report. Our pointed attention was drawn to principle No. 5 mentioned therein which is as under : - "5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk."
The expression ''sufficient cause, has to be construed liberally. This is well established and settled and after construing the expression ''sufficient cause'' their Lordships of the Supreme Court found that there was sufficient cause for the delay and delay was condoned. So far as A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 897 is concerned, in that case, appeals were filed against award in land acquisition case. The High Court condoned the delay. The High Court disposed of the main appeal on merit finally. It was held that it does not bar consideration by the Supreme Court of correctness of the order of the High Court condoning the delay. Cause of delay in that case was alleged to be inaction on part of Government Counsel. While dealing with that question, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court observed as follows : - "There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its Counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bonafides on the part of the party or its Counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a rime-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression ''sufficient cause'' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay."
Their Lordships further observed as under : - "In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it."
The ratio decidendi of the case is that in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes ''sufficient cause'' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government and that Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in condoning delay in the special appeal. It is significant to note that even according to this authority, the law of limitation is, undoubtedly, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities and that Government like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of the officers. An exception was provided and that is that where Government makes out a case that public interest would suffer owing to acts of fraud of bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly on cross'' purposes with it. It may be stated at once that in the case on hand, no averment has been made that on account of acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents or that the officers were clearly on cross purposes with it have been made. In the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, we have no hesitation to say that this authority cannot be availed of by the learned Counsel for the appellants. In the light of the larger principle and binding precedents, we have to examine whether the delay of 26 days have been explained by the opposite party-appellant. Nearly 38 years ago, the highest Court of the country had occasion to consider the question in the context of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act and it was observed in Ramlal and Others v. Rewa Coal Fields Ltd. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 361 as follows : - "..The context seems to suggest that "within such period" means within the period which ends with the last date of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases falling under Sec. 5 what the party has to show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day to day. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed
THIS principle was reiterated in Bikram Dass v. Financial Commissioner and Others (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2221) wherein it was succinctly held as under : - "Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large majority of case-law has grown around Sec. 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every day''s delay."
The matter was also examined in Ajit Singh v. State of Gujarat (A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 733) wherein it was observed as under : - "Now it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay."
IT is, therefore, clear that it is firmly established that it is incumbent on the appellant to explain each day of default beyond the terminus line of the prescribed period of limitation. The appellant does not seem to have a semblance of a case for condonation. The delay of 26 days has to be explained day by day. There does not seem to be even an attempt to conform to the law. We have already extracted Paras 1, 2 and 3 of the application which were supported by the affidavit of Shri Surendra Pal Singh. According to those averments, which are cryptic and bald about delay of 26 days, the explanation of the admitted delay of 26 days cannot be said to have been explained. In the application it even not been averred as to when the prescribed period of limitation expired and the facts or factors from that point till the date of filing of the appeal. The appellant Department does not seem to be aware of the strict requirements of law and the burden it has to discharge to avail the benefit of condo nation both under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or the proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act A somewhat similar question on almost identical facts arose before the State Commission in Appeals No. 121/91 and 125/1991 decided on August 27, 1991. In those appeals, the applications for condonation of delay were dismissed and the appeals were also dismissed because of the bar of limitation. A revision petition by Rajasthan State Insurance and G.P.F. Department was filed against the order of the State Commission dismissing the appeal and the National Commission vide its order dated 18-8-92 dismissed the revision. For the forgoing reasons we find not the least merit in the application for condonation and dismiss the same. Inevitably the appeal of the appellant has, therefore, to be dismissed because of the bar of limitation. The appeal is accordingly dismissed as time barred. Appeal dismissed.