Dr. G.L. Vaishnawi vs Triloki Nath Vaishnawi and another

Jaswant Singh, J.—The plaintiff has sued for declaration that he is the real and true owner of the properties mentioned in the plaint which

stood Benami in the name of defendant No. 1 and for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the same in any manner. He has

also prayed that a decree for possession in respect of land measuring 41 Kanals and 8 Marias situated at Bagat Burzalla Tehsil Badgam as

described in Schedule forming an annex tire to the plaint with the direction that defendant No. 2 should remove the construction raised by him on

the land be passed in his favour. He has put different valuation on the reliefs sought by him. In Para 18 of his petition of plaint, he has stated us

follows:

The value for purposes of court-fee for declaration is fixed at Rs. 10 under Schedule II Article 17 (3) Court Fees Act and Rs. 130 for the

injunction. The value for jurisdiction for declaration is fixed at Rupees 100,000 and Rs 130 for injunction and the total being Rs. LOO, 130. The

value for purposes of court-lees so far the suit for possession is valued at eight times land revenue, Rs. 18.30 and is Rs. 146.40 jurisdictional value

at fifty times the same land revenue is as Rs. 916. The properties are situated in the territorial jurisdiction and also the parties reside in the same

jurisdiction so the Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to try this suit.

It is contended on behalf of defendant No. 2 that the plaintiff has deliberately under-valued the suit for purposes of court-fee, that the suit being

essentially for declaration with consequential relief, the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction in terms of Section 8 of the

Suits Valuation Act must be the same, that the plaintiff having himself valued the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rupees 100, 130 ad valorem

court-fee is chargeable on this amount viz., on Rs 100, 130 and the plaintiff should, therefore, be called upon to make up the deficiency in the

court-fees.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff has, on the other hand, contended that the reliefs for declaration and injunction are separate and distinct, that the

relief for declaration has been correctly valued according to Article 17 (3) of Schedule 2 of the Court Fees Act, that there is no question of making

up the deficiency in court-fees, and that in case the Court comes to the conclusion that the valuation is not correct, he should be allowed to put the

correct valuation and pay the court-fees accordingly.

I have given my earnest consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. Reading the petition of plaint as a whole

and looking to the substance of the claim, it appears to me that the reliefs sought in respect of the properties mentioned in Schedules, A, B and D

of the plaint is really for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff is the real and true owner of the properties and that the relief of injunction sought

by him is merely a consequential relief which flows from the aforesaid declaratory relief sought by him. In the circumstances, the plaintiff ought to

have put a single valuation on the reliefs of declaration and injunction according to Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act.

In Balaram Mandal Vs. Sahebjan Gazi and Others, , it has been held as under:

The present case is one where the plaintiff has prayed for a declaration of his title and permanent injunction restraining the defendant from

interfering with his possession. The question is whether Section 7 (iv) (c) Court Fees Act is attracted to the facts of this case. Section 7 (iv) (c),

Court Fees Act, would apply if the suit is one for a declaration where a consequential relief is prayed for. The expression ""consequential relief"" has

been defined to mean some relief which follows directly from the declaration, the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained

and which is not specifically provided for and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantial relief. Kalu Ram Vs. Babu Lal

and Others, ; AIR 1941 97 (Lahore) . Tested in this light, the prayer for a permanent injunction in the present case is a consequential relief. The

present case, therefore, directly comes within Sec. 7 (iv) (c) Court Fees Act. Court-fees are, therefore, payable ad valorem on the amount at

which the relief is sought to be valued in the plaint, subject to the provisions of Sec. 8 (c) Court Fees Act.

In the plaint, the plaintiff has valued the relief for declaration at Rs. 1,000 and the consequential relief by way of a permanent injunction at Rs. 10.

A fixed court-fee of Rs. 20 has been paid on the former relief under Sch. II Art. 17 (iii) and on the latter relief under Sec. 7 (iv) (d) Court Fees

Act. Such a mode of valuation is entirely erroneous and the court-fees paid are not in terms of the Statute. The correct mode of valuation of the

relief in such a case is to put a single valuation, the option of valuing the relief resting with the plaintiff.

Again in Chhatu Lal Shaw Vs. Panchanan Shaw and Others, , it has held as follows:

Suit for declaration with consequential relief-The correct mode of valuation in such a case is to put a single valuation, the option of valuing the relief

resting with the plaintiff.

Following the above-mentioned authorities, 1 am of the view that the plaintiff should have in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (c)

of the Court Fees Act, put one single valuation on the reliefs of declaration and injunction for the purpose of court-fees in respect of the properties

detailed in Schedules A. B and D of the plaint.

Let me now advert to the contention of Mr. Raina that the plaintiff having valued the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 100, 130 the court-

fees should also be computed on the same value and the plaintiff should be called upon to make up the deficiency. This contention in my opinion, is

based on a misconception of the true legal position, It is now well settled that in suits falling under Sec. 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act, it is the option

of the plaintiff to value his claim and it is the amount at which he has valued the relief sought for court-tees that determines the value for jurisdiction

of the suit and not vice versa. Reference in this connection may be made to S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan

Chettiar, , where their Lordships observed as follows:

There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of Section 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value

as determinable for computation of court-tees and that is natural enough. The computation of court-tees in suits falling u/s 7 (iv) of the Act depends

upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of

court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-tees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such

cases, but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be

determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fees that determines the

value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa.

In regard, however, to the reliefs in respect of the land mentioned in Schedule C of the plaint, I am of the view that the essential and substantial

relief being that of possession a declaration in that behalf need not have been asked for and may be ignored. Reference in this connection may with

advantage be made to an authority reported in Uchhab Gouda and Others Vs. Ganesh Panda, .

Again for the ancillary direction for removal of the construction stated to have been raised by the defendant No. 2 on the land no additional

court-fee need be paid as held in AIR 1962 AP 408.

Viewing the matter in the light of the authorities reported in Uchhab Gouda and Others Vs. Ganesh Panda, and AIR 1962 AP 408, I hold that

the plaintiff could in respect of this property justifiably value the suit for purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction at 8 times and 50 times the land

revenue respectively in accordance with Section 7 (v) (b) of the Court Fees Act read with Rule 1 of the Rules framed under the Suits Valuation

Act.

In the result, I allow the plaintiff to amend his valuation for purposes of court fees and state the amount at which he values the relief sought by

him for purposes of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act in respect of the properties described in Schedules A, B and D of the plaint and pay

the court-tees accordingly within a month from today. The valuation in respect of the land mentioned in Schedule C of the plaint, is, however,

accepted as correct. The preliminary issue framed vide my order dated 28th March 1968, is decided accordingly.

Order accordingly.