Ghulam Din vs Mohammad Syed and others

(1) The only issue that I am at present called upon to determine in this suit for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff continues to be the owner of

2/5th of the property mentioned in para 2 of the plaint and for permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from interfering with the plaintiff's

possession of his share of the property is Issue No 3, which is to the following effect :

Is the suit not properly valued for purposes of jurisdiction and court fee ?

Para 14 of the plaint reads thus :

The valuation for purposes of court fees and jurisdiction is fixed as follows :

(a) For declaration fixed court fee of Rs. 10.00 and for jurisdiction. Rs. 20,000/

(b) For injunction, for court fee and jurisdiction. Rs. 100/

(2) It is contended on behalf of defendant No. J that the court fees has not been correctly paid on his plaint by the plaintiff, that it was not open to

the plaintiff to put separate valuations for reliefs of declaration and injunction, that as the relief of injunction flows directly from the relief of

declaration, the suit is governed by section 7(iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, that as the suit is virtually for the cancellation of the sale deed dated

December 16th, 1960, the plaintiff ought to have paid advalorem court fees on Rs. 50,000/ and that in any case the plaintiff must pay advalorem

court fees on the consolidated amount of Rs. 20.100/ the valuation stated by him in his plaint for purposes of jurisdiction.

(3) The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has on the other hand, urged that the relief of injunction sought by his client is separate

and distinct from the relief of declaration, that the former relief does not flow from the latter 3 relief, that the causes of action for the two reliefs

which are quite independent rare also quite distinct and separate that the suit is neither for cancellation of the sale deed dated Dec. 16th, 1960, nor

is it necessary for the plaintiff to seek cancellation of the deed and that the suit has been correctly valued.

(4) I have given my earnest consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.

(5) It is now well settled that the question of court fees is to be decided with reference to the averments in the plaint and that in deciding whether

the case is governed by section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, the vital test is whether the consequential relief asked for would follow directly

from the declaration given, the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for anywhere

in the Act and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantive relief. It will be advantageous in this connection to refer to the

decisions in Kalu Ram Versus Babu Lal, AIR 1932 All 485,I L R 54 All 812, F B. Mat. Zebulnisa Versus Din Mohammad, AIR 1941 Lahore,

97, ILR (1941) Lab 451 FB and Balram Mandal Versus Sahabjan Gazl AIR 1950 Cal 85 ; 54 Cal. WN 139, as also the decision of this court in

Dr. G. L. Vaishnavi Venus Triloki Nath Vaishnavi and another. AIR 1968 J&K 110.

(6) A careful perusal of the plaint in the instant case would show that the relief of injunction claimed by the plaintiff flows directly from the relief of

declaration sought for by him and is as such a consequential reliei as contemplated by Section 7 (iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act The contention of

Shri Sunder Lal that the causes of actions for the two reliefs claimed by his client are independent is misconceived. Even according to the decision

in Karuppayee Ammal and others Versus Periasatni Goundan AIR 51 Mad. 604, relied upon by Shri Sunder Lal relief for injunction may be said

not to be consequential on the relief of declaration when boch the reliefs are based on different causes of action. In this instant case both the reliefs

are founded on the same set of facts. Again a perusal of para 12 of the plaint shows that the causes of action for the both reliefs are also the same.

The contention therefore of Sh S. Lal that the causes of action for the two reliefs are independent not being well founded is repelled and it is held

that the plaintiff must give consolidated valuation for the two reliefs asked for by him.

(7) There is, however, no force in the contention of Sh. J N. Bhan that the plaintiffs ought to pay ad volarem court fees on Rs. 50.000/ the

consideration of the sale deed dated December 16th, 1960. Unlike the case of Kalu Ram Versus Babu Lal AIR 1932 All 435, (Supra) relied

upon by Shri Bhan, the plaintiff in the present case has not asked for cancellation of the aforesaid sale deed nor was it necessary for him to do so. I

therefore find myself unable to accede to the contention of Sh. Bhan.

(8) The only question that now remains to be decided is whether the plaintiff should be required to pay court fees on the amount of Rs. 20.100/ the

valuation put by the plaintiff for purposes of jurisdiction. The contention of Sbri Bhan that the plaintiff having valued his suit for purposes of

jurisdiction at Rs. 21,000/ he has to pay court fees on the valuation is also net well founded. It is now well settled that in the suits falling under

section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff has got the liberty to value his claim and it is the amount at which he values the relief for court

fees that determines the valuation for jurisdiction and not viceversa. I am fortified in this behalf by a decision of the Supreme Court in Chattiar

Versus Ramnathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 245, where their Lordships observed :

''There can be little doubt that the effect of the provision of section 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value

as determinable, for computation of court fees and is natural enough. The contusion of court fees in suits falling under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act

depends on the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose

of court fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value of court fees and the value for jurisdiction must, no doubt, be the same in such

cases but it is the value for court fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be

determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purpose of court fees that determines the

value for jurisdiction in the suit and not viceversa.

(9) From the above enunciation of law, it is clear that it is the value for court fees stated by the plaintiff that is of fundamental importance and that it

is upon this valuation that the valuation for jurisdiction is to be determined.

(10) For the foregoing reasons, I would decide this issue against the plaintiff but would allow him an opportunity to state the amount at which he

would like to value the relief sought by him as required by Section 7 (iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act and amend the valuations already stated by him

within a period of ten days from today. Put up for further proceedings on August 3rd, 1972.