Ghulam Din vs Mohamad Syed and others

Jaswant Singh, J.—The only issue that I am at present called upon to determine in this suit for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff

continues to be the owner of 2/5th of the property mentioned in para 2 of the plaint and for permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from

interfering with the plaintiff's possession of his share of the property is Issue No. 3. which is to the following effect:-

Is the suit not properly valued for purposes of jurisdiction and Court fee ?

Para 14 of the plaint reads thus:

The valuation for purposes of Court fees and jurisdiction is fixed as follows:-

(a) For declaration fixed Court fee of Rs. 10/- and for jurisdiction............... Rs. 20,000/-

(b) For injunction, for Court fee and jurisdiction............ Rs. 100/-

It is contended on behalf of defendant No. 1 that the Court fees has not been correctly Paid on his plaint by the plaintiff, that it was not open to the

plaintiff to put separate valuations for reliefs of declaration and injunction, that as the relief of injunction flows directly from the relief of declaration,

the suit is governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. that as the suit is virtually for the cancellation of the sale deed dated December 16,

1960, the plaintiff ought to have Paid ad valorem Court fees on Rs. 50,000/- and that in any case the plaintiff must pay ad valorem Court fees on

the consolidated amount of Rs. 20,100/- the valuation stated by him in his plaint for purposes of jurisdiction.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of tile Plaintiff has, on the other hand, urged that the relief of injunction sought by his client is separate

and distinct from the relief of declaration, that the former relief does not flow from the latter relief, that the causes of action for the two reliefs which

are quite independent are also quite distinct and separate, that the suit is neither for cancellation of the sale deed dated December 16, 1960, nor is

it necessary for the plaintiff to seek cancellation of the deed and that the suit has been correctly valued.

I have given my earnest consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.

It is now well settled that the question of Court fees is to be decided with reference to the averments in the plaint and that in deciding whether

the case is governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court fees Act. the vital test is whether the consequential relief asked for would follow directly

from the declaration given, the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for anywhere

in the Act. and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantive relief. It will be advantageous in this connection to refer to the

decisions in Kalu Ram Vs. Babu Lal and Others, : AIR 1941 97 (Lahore) and Balaram Mandal Vs. Sahebjan Gazi and Others, . as also the

decision of this Court in Dr.G. L. Vaishnavi v. Triloki Nath Vaishnavi, AIR 1968 J&K 110.

A careful perusal of the plaint in the instant case would show that the relief of injunction claimed by the plaintiff flows directly from the relief of

declaration sought for by him and is as such a consequential relief as contemplated by Sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act. The contention of Shri

Sunder Lal that the causes of action for the two reliefs claimed by his client are independent is misconceived. Even according to the decision in

Karuppayee Ammal and Others Vs. Periasami Goundan, relied upon by Shri Sunder Lal relief for injunction may be said not to be consequential

on the relief of declaration when both the reliefs are based on different causes of action. In the instant case both the reliefs are founded on the same

set of facts. Again a perusal of para 12 of the plaint shows that the causes of action for the two reliefs are also the same. The contention therefore

of Shri S. Lal that the causes of action for the two reliefs are independent not being well founded is repelled and it is held that the plaintiff must give

consolidated valuation for the two reliefs asked for by him.

There is, however, no force in the contention of Shri J. N. Bhan that the plaintiffs ought to pay ad valorem Court fee on Rs. 50,000/- the

consideration of the sale deed dated December 16, 1960. Unlike the case of Kalu Ram Vs. Babu Lal and Others, relied upon by Shri Bhan. the

plaintiff in the present case has not asked for cancellation of the aforesaid sale deed nor was it necessary for him to do so. I, therefore, find myself

unable to accede to the contention of Shri Bhan.

The only question that now remains to be decided is whether the plaintiff should be required to Pay Court fees on the amount of Rs. 20,100/-

the valuation put by the plaintiff for purposes of jurisdiction. The contention of Shri Bhan that the plaintiff having valued his suit for purposes of

jurisdiction at Rs. 20,000/- he has to pay Court fees on that valuation is also not well founded. It is now well settled that in suits falling u/s 7 (iv) (c)

of the Court Fees Act. the plaintiff has got the liberty to value his claim and it is the amount at which he values the relief for Court fees that

determines the valuation for jurisdiction and not vice versa. I am fortified in this behalf by a decision of the Supreme Court in S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp.

Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, , where their Lordships observed:-

There can be little doubt that the effect of the provision of Section 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value

as determinable, for computation of Court fees and that is natural enough. The computation of Court fees in suits falling u/s 7 (iv) of the Act

depends on the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose

of Court fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for Court fees and the value for jurisdiction must, no doubt, be the same in such

cases but it is the value for Court fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be

determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purpose of Court fees that determines the

value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice-versa.

From the above enunciation of law, it is clear that it is the value for Court fees stated by the plaintiff that is of fundamental importance and that it is

upon this valuation that the valuation for jurisdiction is to be determined.

For the foregoing reasons, I would decide this issue against the plaintiff but would allow him an opportunity to state the amount at which he

would like to value the relief sought by him as required by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. and amend the valuations already stated by him

within a period of ten days from today. Put up for further proceedings on August 3, 1972.