HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs Vasundhara Co -operative Group House Society Ltd.

PETITIONERS /opposite parties being aggrieved by order dated 3.7.2012, passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,

Haryana, Panchkula (for short, State Commission) have filed the present revision petition under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act,

1986 (for short, ''Act''). Along with it, applications seeking exemption from filing the certified copy of the impugned order as well as condonation

of delay of 476 days have been filed. Brief facts are that Respondent/Complainant Society was allotted a plot in Faridabad. As per terms of the

allotment, Respondent''s Society was entitled to rebate of 20% of the price of land, if it was able to complete the construction within 3 years from

the offer of the possession. Respondent completed the construction work within 3 years with intimation to the petitioners for claiming the rebate.

However, petitioners rejected their claim. Hence, a Consumer Complaint was filed before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum,

Faridabad (for short, ''District Forum'').

THE Consumer Complaint was contested by the petitioners, who in their written statement took the plea that Respondent''s Society has not

completed the construction within the prescribed period and as such there is no delay on its part.

District Forum vide order dated 25.5.2011, allowed the complaint and directed the petitioners;

To release rebate amount of 20% of the land cost of the plot in question after deducting 10% of the land cost, if already paid. This amount shall

be refunded with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of complaint till the date of payment. The respondents are also directed to pay Rs. 2,200

as litigation expenses to the complainant society.

BEING aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the State Commission, which was dismissed vide the impugned order.

HENCE , the present revision.

We have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners on applications for exemption as well as condonation of delay and gone through the record.

IT has been contended by learned Counsel that delay has occurred due to unavoidable circumstances, as earlier Counsel could not file the

petition within time. Therefore, petitioners withdrew the case from him and handed over the same to a new Counsel. Thus, the delay is unintentional

and unavoidable.

ADMITTEDLY , petitioner has not filed the certified copy of the impugned order dated 3.7.2012, till date though the same was received by the

petitioners from its Counsel. Hence, we fail to understand as to why certified copy of the impugned order has not been filed along with this

Revision Petition.

In the application for exemption, plea of petitioners is, that it never received the certified copy of the impugned order in its office. Petitioners are

taking contradictory stand in this regard. On the one hand, it states that after receiving the copy of the impugned order from its Counsel the same

was analyzed by it, whereas on the other hand petitioners have taken the plea, that no copy of the order was received by it.

SINCE , certified copy of the impugned order has not been filed by the petitioners though the same was received by it, on this short ground

alone petition is liable to be thrown out.

NOW coming to the condonation application, the impugned order was passed on 3.7.2012 and copy of the same was received by the

petitioners on the same very day. But revision has been filed only on 20.1.2014. Thus, there is a delay of 476 days.

The grounds on which condonation has been sought read as under:

That after receipt of the copy of the impugned order form the Counsel of the petitioner, the same was analyzed by the petitioner in view of the

financial implications and policy issues involved therein. Considering the importance of the matter, it was thereafter decided by the petitioner that

revision petition may be filed challenging the orders passed by the Forums below. Hence, necessary approvals were taken for filing the said

revision.

Thereafter, engagement letter was issued to Mr. R.S. Badhran for filing the revision petition and necessary documents were sent vide letters

dated 13.8.2012 and 29.11.2012. However, revision petition could not be filed. In the meantime the respondent filed execution petition and the

petitioner requested the Counsel to intimate regarding the status of the revision petition vide letters dated 16.7.2013, 12.8.2013, but still petitioner

withdrew the case form the earlier Counsel and handed over the entire record to the present Counsel on 10.12.2013. Drafted petition was sent for

approval by the present Counsel on 12.12.2013. Thereafter, the same was verified, approved and further documents provided. Hence, on account

of the above, unavoidable delay of 476 days has occurred, which is unintentional unavoidable and highly regretted.

IT is well settled that ''sufficient cause'' with regard to condonation of delay in each case, is a question of fact.

IN Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., : AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, the Court observed:

It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in

question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not

proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then

the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all

relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while

exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.

In R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, : I (2009) CLT 188 (SC) : I (2009) SLT 701 : 2009 (2) Scale 108, Apex Court has observed:

We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained.

This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of

his appeal/petition.

APEX Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, : IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), laid down that - -

It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the

special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and

the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against

the orders of the Consumer Foras.

FURTHER , Hon''ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and Others v. Living Media India Ltd. and Another, : II (2012) SLT 312 : I

(2012) CLT 338 (SC) : (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563, has held:

After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and

Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under:

It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time -limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy

for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly.

Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the Courts'' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant

statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation

to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the

beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by

resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner.

One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land losers . These public interest parameters

ought to be kept in mind by the Courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Dragging the land losers to Courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot

be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of

public revenue. It serves no public interest.

The Court further observed:

It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of

limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of

limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with Court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and

acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the

Government is a party before us.

Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack

of bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the

Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic

methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation

undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and

acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending

for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red -tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special

obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as

an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a

few.

Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates,

according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.

In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be

decided in an appropriate case.

In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs.

As per application for condonation of delay, the petitioners have tried to shift the entire blame on its previous Counsel Mr. R.S. Badhran,

Advocate, to whom the paper was sent vide letters dated 13.8.212 and 19.11.2012, for filing the revision petition.

IT appears that after handing over the papers to Mr. Badhran, petitioners went into deep slumber and woke up only when respondent filed the

execution petition. Thereafter, only petitioners requested its Counsel to intimate the status, vide letters dated 16.7.2013 and 12.8.2013. Petitioners

even after getting the intimation about the filing of the execution petition as on 16.7.2013, did not take steps to file the revision petition on an urgent

basis. Thereafter, in a casual manner petitioners filed this revision petition only on 20.1.2014. Thus, it is manifestly clear that there was no sense of

urgency on the part of any of the officials of the petitioners, to ensure that after having got the knowledge of the execution petition they ought to

have taken urgent steps for filing the revision, if any. There is also nothing on record to show that petitioners ever took any action against its

previous Counsel, who is purported to have kept the petitioners in dark.

IT is well settled that it is the duty of every litigant to post himself about the fate of its case. It is also a fact that petitioners is a Government

Body, having full -fledged legal department under its command and a large number of battery of lawyers for perusing the litigations. Hence, the

grounds taken as sufficient cause in the present case seeking condonation of delay, cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be a ""Sufficient

Cause

Thus, ex facie gross negligence, deliberate inaction and lack of bona fides are imputable to the petitioners. Under the circumstances, no grounds

whatsoever are made out for condoning the long delay of 476 days.

MOREOVER , observations made by the Hon''ble Apex Court in the authoritative pronouncements discussed above, are fully attracted to the

facts and circumstances of the case.

EVEN after getting two adverse findings, petitioners have chosen not to settle the claim of respondent No. 1 but has dragged him to the highest

Fora under the Act.

It is not that every order passed by Fora below is to be challenged by a litigant even when the same are based on sound reasoning.

IT is a well -known fact that Courts across the country are saddled with large number of cases. Public Sector Undertakings indulgences further

burden them. Time and again, Courts have been expressing their displeasure at the Government/Public Sector Undertakings compulsive litigation

habit but a solution to this alarming trend is a distant dream. The judiciary is now imposing costs upon Government/Public Sector Undertaking not

only when it pursues cases which can be avoided but also when it forces the public to do so.

PUBLIC Sector Undertakings spent more money on contesting cases than the amount they might have to pay to the claimant. In addition

thereto, precious time, effort and other resources go down the drain in vain. Public Sector Undertakings are possibly an apt example of being

penny wise, pound -foolish. Rise in frivolous litigation is also due to the fact that Public Sector Undertakings though having large number of legal

personnel under their employment, do not examine the cases properly and force poor litigants to approach the Court.

The Apex Court in Bikaner Urban Improvement Trust v. Mohan Lal, : I (2010) CPJ 1 (SC) : : 2010 CTJ 121 (Sc) (CP), has made significant

observations which have material bearing, namely,

It is a matter of concern that such frivolous and unjust litigation by Governments and statutory authorities are on the increase. Statutory

Authorities exist to discharge statutory functions in public interest. They should be responsible litigants. They cannot raise frivolous and unjust

objections, nor act in a callous and highhanded manner. They cannot behave like some private litigants with profiteering motives. Nor can they

resort to unjust enrichment. They are expected to show remorse or regret when their officers act negligently or in an overbearing manner. When

glaring wrong acts by their officers is brought to their notice, for which there is no explanation or excuse, the least that is expected is

restitution/restoration to the extent possible with appropriate compensation. Their harsh attitude in regard to genuine grievances of the public and

their indulgence in unwarranted litigation requires to the corrected.

This Court has repeatedly expressed the view that the Governments and statutory authorities should be model or ideal litigants and should not

put forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust) contentions to obstruct the path of justice. We may refer to some of the decisions in this

behalf.

5.1 in Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India, : 1973 (3) SCC 554, where this Court extracted with approval, the following statement (from an earlier

decision of the Kerala High Court):

''''The State, under our Constitution, undertakes economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and inevitably gets involved in disputes

with private individuals. But it must be remembered that the State is no ordinary party trying to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook

or by crook; for the State''s interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial defence and never to score a technical point or overreach a

weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure an unfair advantage, simply because legal devices provide such an opportunity. The State is a

virtuous litigant and looks with unconcern on immoral forensic successes so that if on the merits the case is weak. Government shows a willingness

to settle the dispute regardless of prestige and other lesser motivations, which move private parties to fight in Court. The lay -out on litigation costs

and execution time by the State and its agencies is so staggering these days because of the large amount of litigation in which it is involved that a

positive and wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin methods of not being tempted into forensic showdowns

where a reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of

Government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on

State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957.

5.2 in Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International by its Proprietor V. Venkatadri (Dead) by L.Rs. : (1979) 4 SCC, 176, held:

It is high time that Governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating

legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. Of course, if a Government or a public authority takes up a technical plea,

the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well founded, it has to be upheld by the Court, but what we feel is that such a plea should not ordinarily

be taken up by a Government or a public authority, unless of course the claim is not well founded and by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence

for the purpose of resisting such a claim has become unavailable.

5.3 in a three -Judge Bench judgment of Bhag Singh & Ors. v. Union Territory of Chandigarh through LAC, Chandigarh, : (1985) 3 SCC 737.

The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is

received or recovered without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to

defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen.

Unwarranted litigation by Governments and statutory authorities basically stem from the two general baseless assumptions by their officers. They

are:

(i) All claims against the Government/statutory authorities should be viewed as illegal and should be resisted and fought up to the highest Court of

the land.

(ii) If taking a decision on an issue could be avoided, then it is prudent not to decide the issue and let the aggrieved party approach the Court and

secure a decision.

The reluctance to take decisions, or tendency to challenge all orders against them, is not the policy of the Governments or statutory authorities, but

is attributable to some officers who are responsible for taking decisions and/or officers -in -charge of litigation. Their reluctance arises from an

instinctive tendency to protect themselves against any future accusations of wrong decision making, or worse, of improper motives for any decision

-making. Unless their insecurity and fear is addressed, officers will continue to pass on the responsibility of decision making to Courts and

Tribunals. The Central Government is now attempting to deal with this issue by formulating realistic and practical norms for defending cases filed

against the Government and for filing appeals and revisions against adverse decisions, thereby, eliminating unnecessary litigation. But, it is not

sufficient if the Central Government alone undertakes such an exercise. The State Governments and the statutory authorities, who have more

litigations than the Central Government, should also make genuine efforts to eliminate unnecessary litigation. Vexatious and unnecessary litigation

have been clogging the wheels of justice, for too long making it difficult for Courts and Tribunals to provide easy and speedy access to justice to

bona fide and needy litigants.

In this case, what is granted by the State Commission is the minimum relief in the facts and circumstances, that is to direct allotment of an

alternative plot with a nominal compensation of Rs. 5,000. But instead of remedying the wrong, by complying with the decision of the Consumer

Fora, the Improvement Trust is trying to brazen out its illegal act by contending that the allottee should have protested when it illegally laid the road

in his plot. It has persisted with its unreasonable and unjust stand by indulging in unnecessary litigation by approaching the National Commission

and then this Court. The Trust should sensitize its officers to serve the public rather than justify their dictatorial acts. It should avoid such an

unnecessary litigation.

IN Ravinder Kaur v. Ashok Kumar, : VI (2003) SLT 505 : AIR 2004 SC 904, Apex Court observed:

Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment debtor to deny the decree holders the fruits of the

decree obtained by them. These type of errors on the part of the judicial Forum only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing law''s

delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system.

VERY recently, Hon''ble Supreme Court in Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and Others, : II (2014) CCR 405 (SC) : IV (2014) SLT

380, Writ Petition Criminal No. 57 of 2014, decided on 6.5.2014 has observed:

This abuse of the judicial process is not limited to any particular class of litigants. The State and its agencies litigate endlessly upto the highest

Court, just because of the lack of responsibility, to take decisions. So much so, that we have started to entertain the impression, that all

administrative and executive decision making, are being left to Courts, just for that reason. In private litigation as well, the concerned litigant would

continue to approach the higher Court, despite the fact that he had lost in every Court hitherto before. The effort is not to discourage a litigant, in

whose perception, his cause is fair and legitimate. The effort is only to introduce consequences, if the litigant''s perception was incorrect, and if his

cause is found to be, not fair and legitimate, he must pay for the same. In the present setting of the adjudicatory process, a litigant, no matter how

irresponsible he is, suffers no consequences. Every litigant, therefore likes to take a chance, even when Counsel''s advice is otherwise

It would be pertinent to point out that the present petition came up for hearing before this Commission for first time on 30.1.2014. After arguing for

some time, learned Counsel for petitioners sought time to take instructions as to whether petitioners want to pursue with the present petition or not,

since there was delay of 476 days.

ON 25.3.2014, learned Counsel for petitioners stated that Petitioner -Authority has not taken any decision so far. Therefore, we directed the

Estate Officer, HUDA, to appear in person.

ON 28.3.2014, Mr. Satpal Singh, Estate Officer, HUDA, Faridabad appeared and sought time for taking instruction. On 16.5.2014, learned

Counsel for petitioners on instructions stated that petitioners want to pursue the matter.

It appears that Estate Officer of Petitioners -Authority who has filed his affidavit in support of the present revision petition has not applied his mind

judiciously and filed this petition in a mechanical manner due to lack of responsibility. In this regard, observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme

Court in Subrata Roy Sahara (supra), are fully applicable to the present case.

IT appears to us that the only intention of petitioners is just to deprive the respondent/complainant the fruits of the award, which was passed

more than three years ago.

UNDER these circumstances, while disallowing the application for condonation of delay, we dismiss the present revision petition being barred

by limitation with punitive cost of Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only).

Petitioners are directed to deposit the cost by way of demand draft in the name of ''Consumer Legal Aid Account'', within six weeks from today.

In case, petitioners fail to deposit the said cost within the prescribed period, then it shall also be liable to pay interest @ 9% p.a., till realization.

PETITIONERS shall recover the above cost from the salaries of the delinquent officials/officers, which shall include Mr. Satpal Singh, Estate

Officer, HUDA, Faridabad, who is instrumental in pursuing this meritless and frivolous litigation, with the sole aim of wasting the public exchequer.

The affidavit giving the details of the Officers from whose salaries the cost has been recovered, be also filed within six weeks.

PENDING applications also stand dismissed. List on 18.7.2014 for compliance.