HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY , Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority, vs Lata Mittal

AS usual, petitioners being a public body has filed the present revision petition alongwith application for condonation of delay not one but two applications. It is a common experience of this Commission, that Govt./Public/Statutory bodies have taken a vow that they will not file Revisions/Appeals unless the same are to be accompanied by application for condonation of delay. There is a perception in the mind of the Statutory Bodies/Authorities who are having full fledged legal departments, that they are above law and provisions of Limitation does not apply to them that is why, invariably in more than 90% of the Petitions/Appeals filed by Govt. Bodies, are being accompanied by application for condonation of delay.

HOWEVER , the matter does not rest here. In the present case, it appears that officials of legal department of the Petitioners '' Authority are either ignorant of Law of Limitation or are so negligent that they are not even aware as to how the period of limitation is to be reckoned. In first application for condonatiion of delay filed alongwith present revision petition, no period of delay has been mentioned at all.

Be that as it may, in the second application for condonation of delay dated 13.2.2012, the period of condonation of delay has been mentioned as 354 days. On the face of it, period of delay of 354 days is patently wrong.

STATE Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula (for short, ''State Commission) vide its impugned order dated 20.11.2009, disposed of the appeal of the petitioners, challenging order dated 31.1.2005 passed by District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Panchkula (for short, ''District Forum '') As per record, the certified copy of impugned order was received by the petitioners on 1st December, 2009, whereas present revision has been filed on 21st September, 2010. After excluding the prescribed period for filing of the revision petition, there is delay of 204 days and not 354 days as pleaded by the petitioners. This speaks for the working of Petitioners '' Authority legal department.

NOW coming to the facts of the case, respondent/complainant is the original allottee in respect of plot No. 1567-P Sector-12, Sonepat, measuring 162 sq. mtrs. which was allotted, vide allotment letter dated 3.5.1995. It is alleged that despite deposit of 25% money and various installments, petitioners have not offered the clear physical possession of the said plot to the respondent till date, as the said area has not been developed and the same is unworthy to construct and live therein. It is further alleged that petitioners have failed to deliver the possession of the said plot to the respondent which amounts to deficiency in service and adoption of unfair trade practice. Hence, this complaint. Petitioners /O.Ps filed their joint written statement stating therein that as per clause No. 6 of the allotment letter, they can charge interest on delayed payment. The possession stood offered to the respondent and she can start construction after taking physical possession. No possession interest has been charged form the respondent so far. Since, possession stood offered on 15.4.2002, hence, respondent is not entitled for any compensation on this account. District Forum, vide its order dated 13.1.2005, allowed the complaint and directed ; "a) Ops to pay interest-compensation at the rate of 15% PA on the amount deposited before 3.5.1997 w.e.f. 3.5.1997 till 15.4.2004 and on the amount deposited after 3.5.1997 w.e.f. the date of deposit till 15.4.2004. b) And also pay Rs. 1,000/- as costs of proceedings ".

AGGRIEVED by the order of the District Forum, Petitioners filed an appeal before the State Commission. Vide its impugned order, State Commission reduced the rate of interest from 15% p. a. to 12% p.a.

I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners on application for condonation of delay and have gone through the record. The grounds on which condonation of delay has been sought are reproduced as under ; "4. That after obtaining the copy of order the case was processed for taking the decision through various channels/branches of the petitioner authority i.e. Engineering Branch, Accounts Branch and Estate Officer, HUDA, Sonipat. After processing of the said case through concerned division/branches the matter was referred to the legal branch/LR office and ultimately Legal Branch proposed for filing the revision petition and the matter was referred to the Administrator and the Administrator approved the proposal for filing the revision petition and the LR office engaged the counsel for preparation of the draft revision petition. Again after obtaining draft revision petition from the counsel the draft revision petition was sent to the Estate Officer, HUDA Sonipat for verification of the facts and again the matter was processed and sent back in the Legal Branch after verification of the facts by the Engineering Branch, Accounts Branch and Estate Division. The whole procedure was time consuming and due to that reasons the petitioner failed to file the revision petition within time. 5. That now there is a delay in filing the present revision petition which is neither deliberately or on account of culpable or on account of malafide nor intentional but on account of aforementioned circumstances. 6. That there are sufficient grounds which warrant the condonation of delay in filing the present revision petition as the petitioner have not been benefited in any manner whatsoever on account of delay in filing the present revision petition. For substantial justice the Hon ''ble Commission is fully empowered under the Consumer Protection Act to delay the condonation. The petitioner is Government authority and the delay in filing the revision petition is only procedural delay and not intentional ".

In the entire application, not even a single date or period has been mentioned so as to show as for what period the matter was processed by different branches of the petitioners and which officials had dealt with it. Application is absolutely silent and vague on these material facts. Reasons for delay do not lead anywhere as to at which level the delay had occurred and who was responsible for delay of 204 days.

It is well settled that "sufficient cause " for condoning the delay in each case is a question of fact.

IN Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed; "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. "

Similarly, in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kailash Devi and Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it has been laid down that; "There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one of is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence. "

IN R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed: "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition. "

Hon ''ble Supreme Court after exhaustively considering the case law on the aspect of condonation of delay observed in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 as under; "We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987)2 SCC 107, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and 10 Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106 ".

Apex Court in Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has observed ; "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras ".

RECENTLY , Hon ''ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563 has held; "24. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under; "29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts'' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest. " The Court further observed; "27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. 31. In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. 32. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs ".

OBSERVATIONS made by Apex Court in the authoritative pronouncements discussed above are fully attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case. Even, after getting two adverse findings, petitioners have chosen not to settle the claim of the respondent but have dragged him to the highest fora under the Act.

It is not that every order passed by fora below is to be challenged by a litigant even when the same are based on sound reasoning.

IT is a well-known fact that Courts across the country are saddled with large number of cases. Public Sector Undertakings indulgences further burden them. Time and again, Courts have been expressing their displeasure at the Government/Public Sector Undertakings compulsive litigation habit but a solution to this alarming trend is a distant dream. The judiciary is now imposing costs upon Government/Public Sector Undertaking not only when it pursue cases which can be avoided but also when it forces the public to do so. Public Sector Undertakings spent more money on contesting cases than the amount they might have to pay to the claimant. In addition thereto, precious time, effort and other resources go down the drain in vain. Public Sector Undertakings are possibly an apt example of being penny wise, pound-foolish. Rise in frivolous litigation is also due to the fact that Public Sector Undertakings though having large number of legal personnel under their employment, do not examine the cases properly and force poor litigants to approach the Court.

THE Apex Court in Bikaner Urban Improvement Trust Vs. Mohal Lal 2010 CTJ 121 (Supreme Court) (CP) has made significant observations which have material bearing, namely, "4. It is a matter of concern that such frivolous and unjust litigation by Governments and statutory authorities are on the increase. Statutory Authorities exist to discharge statutory functions in public interest. They should be responsible litigants. They cannot raise frivolous and unjust objections, nor act in a callous and highhanded manner. They cannot behave like some private litigants with profiteering motives. Nor can they resort to unjust enrichment. They are expected to show remorse or regret when their officers act negligently or in an overbearing manner. When glaring wrong acts by their officers is brought to their notice, for which there is no explanation or excuse, the least that is expected is restitution/restoration to the extent possible with appropriate compensation. Their harsh attitude in regard to genuine grievances of the public and their indulgence in unwarranted litigation requires to the corrected. 5. This Court has repeatedly expressed the view that the Governments and statutory authorities should be model or ideal litigants and should not put forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust) contentions to obstruct the path of justice. We may refer to some of the decisions in this behalf. 5.1 In Dilbagh Rai Jarry V. Union of India, 1973 (3) SCC 554, where this Court extracted with approval, the following statement (from an earlier decision of the Kerala High Court.): "The State, under our Constitution, undertakes economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. But it must be remembered that the State is no ordinary party trying to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or by crook; for the State ''s interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial defence and never to score a technical point or overreach a weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure an unfair advantage, simply because legal devices provide such an opportunity. The State is a virtuous litigant and looks with unconcern on immoral forensic successes so that if on the merits the case is weak. Government shows a willingness to settle the dispute regardless of prestige and other lesser motivations, which move private parties to fight in Court. The lay-out on litigation costs and execution time by the State and its agencies is so staggering these days because of the large amount of litigation in which it is involved that a positive and wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin methods of not being tempted into forensic showdowns where a reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of Government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957. " 5.2 In Madras Port Trust vs. Hymanshu International by its Proprietor V. Venkatadri (Dead) by L.R.s (1979) 4 SCC, 176, held: "2. It is high time that Governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. Of course, if a Government or a public authority takes up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well founded, it has to be upheld by the Court, but what we feel is that such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up by a Government or a public authority, unless of course the claim is not well founded and by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of resisting such a claim has become unavailable. " 5.3 In a three-Judge Bench judgment of Bhag Singh and Ors.v.Union Territory of Chandigarh through LAC, Chandigarh, (1985) 3 SCC 737. "3. The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen. " 6. Unwarranted litigation by Governments and statutory authorities basically stem from the two general baseless assumptions by their officers. They are: (i) All claims against the Government/statutory authorities should be viewed as illegal and should be resisted and fought up to the highest Court of the land. (ii) If taking a decision on an issued could be avoided, then it is prudent not to decide the issue and let the aggrieved party approach the Court and secure a decision. The reluctance to take decisions, or tendency to challenge all orders against them, is not the policy of the Governments or statutory authorities, but is attributable to some officers who are responsible for taking decisions and/or officers-in-charge of litigation. Their reluctance arises from an instinctive tendency to protect themselves against any future accusations of wrong decision making, or worse, of improper motives for any decision-making. Unless their insecurity and fear is addressed, officers will continue to pass on the responsibility of decision making to Courts and Tribunals. The Central Government is now attempting to deal with this issue by formulating realistic and practical norms for defending cases filed against the Government and for filing appeals and revisions against adverse decisions, thereby, eliminating unnecessary litigation. But, it is not sufficient if the Central Government alone undertakes such an exercise. The State Governments and the statutory authorities, who have more litigations than the Central Government, should also make genuine efforts to eliminate unnecessary litigation. Vexatious and unnecessary litigation have been clogging the wheels of justice, for too long making it difficult for courts and Tribunals to provide easy and speedy access to justice to bonafide and needy litigants. 7. In this case, what is granted by the State Commission is the minimum relief in the facts and circumstances, that is to direct allotment of an alternative plot with a nominal compensation of Rs.5,000/- . But instead of remedying the wrong, by complying with the decision of the Consumer Fora, the Improvement Trust is trying to brazen out its illegal act by contending that the allottee should have protested when it illegally laid the road in his plot. It has persisted with its unreasonable and unjust stand by indulging in unnecessary litigation by approaching the National Commission and then this Court. The Trust should sensitize its officers to serve the public rather than justify their dictatorial acts. It should avoid such an unnecessary litigation. "

In Ravinder Kaur Vs. Ashok Kumar, AIR 2004 SC 904, Apex Court observed: " Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment debtor to deny the decree holders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. These type of errors on the part of the judicial forum only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing law ''s delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system. " Thus, gross negligence, deliberate inaction and lack of bonafides is imputable to the petitioners. Accordingly, no sufficient grounds are made out for condoning the long delay of 204 days in filing the present revision petition. The application for condonation of delay under these circumstances is not maintainable and present revision petition being barred by limitation is hereby dismissed with cost of Rs.50,000/-(Rupees Fifty Thousand only).

PETITIONER is directed to deposit the cost by way of demand draft in the name of ''Consumer Legal Aid Account '', within four weeks from today.

MEANWHILE , petitioners shall recover the cost amount from the salaries of the delinquent officers who have been pursuing this merit less and frivolous litigation, with the sole aim of wasting the public exchequer. The affidavit giving the details of the officers/officials from whose salaries the cost has been recovered, be also filed within four weeks. Pending applications, if any stand disposed of.

List on 7.12.2012 for compliance.