Himmat Singh Aneja vs State of Punjab

Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.—Feeling aggrieved against the action of the respondent-State for not including the Non Practicing Allowance (''NPA'' for short) in their basic pay, during their service period, petitioners have approached this Court by way of instant writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ in the nature of Certiorari as well as in the nature of Mandamus.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioners served the respondent-State for a long period, but during their service, NPA was not included in the basic pay of the petitioners. He further submits that orders passed by the respondent-authorities at Annexures P-10, P-13 and P-18 were arbitrary and liable to be set aside. He prays for allowing the present writ petition.

Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners at considerable length, after careful perusal of record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that in the given fact situation of the present case, instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter.

It is a matter of record that the petitioners reached the age of superannuation and retired from service during the years 1986 to 2005. Details in this regard are contained in Annexure P-1 and relevant extract thereof, reads as under:-

During the course of hearing, when a pointed question was put to the learned counsel for the petitioners as to how the present writ petition was maintainable at this belated stage, because it was found suffering from delay and laches, he had no answer and rightly so because it is a matter of record. A bare perusal of the abovesaid details about the dates of retirement of the petitioners would show that even their civil suits would have been hopelessly time barred. Claim of the petitioners has been found to be old and stale one, because of which the present writ petition is suffering from delay and laches, thus, the same is liable to be dismissed.

About the alleged arbitrariness in the impugned orders Annexures P-10, P-13 and P-18, when learned counsel for the petitioner was asked to point out any illegality or arbitrariness in any of the orders, he failed to substantiate his arguments in this regard, as well. Further, while passing the impugned order Annexure P-10, it has been specifically pointed out that Finance Department has expressed its inability to accept the claim of the petitioners because there was no provision in para 4.1 and 4.2 of the Finance Department Instructions on the subject, nor the Pay Commission had made any such recommendation.

It is pertinent to note here that the petitioners have not challenged the policy instructions dated 17.8.2009 in the present writ petition. In the absence of any challenge to the relevant policy instructions of respondent-State, on which the impugned orders are based, no fault can be found with the impugned orders and the same deserve to be upheld. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that present writ petition is misconceived. It is suffering from delay and laches and the same is liable to be dismissed, for this reason also.

The abovesaid view taken by this Court also finds support from the judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in B.S. Bajwa and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Others, ; Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. A. Durairaj (Dead) by L.Rs., ; Londhe Prakash Bhagwan Vs. Dattatraya Eknath Mane and Others, ; Government of India and Anr Vs. George Philip, and Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu,

The relevant observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in para 16 of the judgment in T.T. Murali Babu''s case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:-

Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years'' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others'' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons-who compete with ''Kumbhakarna'' or for that matter ''Rip Van Winkle''. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.

Similar view was taken by this Court in CWP No. 3124 of 2011 (Harnam Singh v. State of Punjab and others) decided on 1.3.2014. Reverting back to the facts of the present case and respectfully following the law laid down in the cases, referred to hereinabove, it is unhesitatingly held that present writ petition has since been found to be suffering from delay and laches, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed. It is so said, because petitioners have woken up from slumber after 28 long years. There is no explanation forthcoming for this inordinate long delay.

No other argument was raised.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that present writ petition is wholly misconceived and without any substance. Thus, it must fail. No case for interference has been made out.

Resultantly, instant writ petition stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.