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Judgment
12 paragraphs · 1,177 wordsRameshwar Singh Malik, J.—Feeling aggrieved against the alleged inaction on the part of respondent authorities, petitioners have approached this Court by way of instant writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ in the nature of Mandamus.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioners were entitled to exercise their fresh option in view of notification dated 24.12.1992 (Annexure P-2). He further submits that claim of the petitioners was supported by a Division Bench judgment dated 21.3.1996 passed in CWP No. 18537 of 1995 (Jawahar Lal Verma Master GHS Manwqal Sangrur and others Vs. State of Punjab and others) and also by Annexures P-5 and P-6. He prays for allowing the present writ petition.
Having heard the learned senior counsel for the petitioners at considerable length, after careful perusal of record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that in the given fact situation of the present case, instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter.
It is an admitted position on record that cause of action, if any, became available to the petitioners in the year 1986. As per own pleaded case of the petitioners, even if notification Annexure P-2 gave them a fresh cause of action, that was also in the year 1992. Petitioners have miserably failed to give any explanation, whatsoever, as to why they could not approach this Court at an earlier point of time, after issuance of the notification Annexure P-2 by the respondent-State in the year 1992. Having said that, this court feels no hesitation to conclude that present petition has been found to be suffering from delay and laches. No explanation is forthcoming about this inordinate delay right from 1986. The writ petition is misconceived and not maintainable, at this belated stage.
During the course of hearing, when a pointed question was put to the learned senior counsel for the petitioners as to what restrained the petitioners from approaching this Court at an earlier point of time, after the year 1992, he had no answer and rightly so because it is a matter of record. So far as order passed by this Court at Annexure P-3 is concerned, that was passed in the year 1996 by the Division Bench of this Court and in that case, petitioners came to this Court within a reasonable time. Since the petitioners had been sleeping over their right, for decades together, they cannot seek any benefit from the order Annexure P-3. Similarly, so far as orders Annexures P-5 and P-6 passed by this Court are concerned, the same are of no help to the petitioners, in view of the later judgments passed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. Thus, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed, for this reason also.
The abovesaid view taken by this Court also finds support from the judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in B.S. Bajwa and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Others, ; Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. A. Durairaj (Dead) by L.Rs., ; Londhe Prakash Bhagwan Vs. Dattatraya Eknath Mane and Others, ; Government of India and Anr Vs. George Philip, and Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu,
The relevant observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in para 16 of the judgment in T.T. Murali Babu''s case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:-
Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years'' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others'' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons-who compete with ''Kumbhakarna'' or for that matter ''Rip Van Winkle''. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.
Similar view was taken by this Court in CWP No. 3124 of 2011 (Harnam Singh v. State of Punjab and others) decided on 1.3.2014. Reverting back to the facts of the present case and respectfully following the law laid down in the cases, referred to hereinabove, it is unhesitatingly held that present writ petition has since been found to be suffering from delay and laches, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed. It is so said, because the petitioners have woken up from slumber after 28 long years. There is no explanation forthcoming for this inordinate long delay.
No other argument was raised.
Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that present writ petition is wholly misconceived and without any substance. Thus, it must fail. No case for interference has been made out.
Resultantly, instant writ petition stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.
