HINDUSTAN COMPUTERS LTD. vs AMARJEET PAUL

THIS appeal has been filed by the opposite party-appellant against the order of the District Forum, Bhatinda, dated August 6, 1991, in complaint case No. 4 of 10.1.1991. The appellant has also filed an application under the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act (for short, ''the Act'') for condonation of delay of 15 days in filing the appeal on the ground that the impugned order dated 6.8.1991 was passed in the absence of the appellant and that the appeal be treated within limitation of 30 days from the date of knowledge derived from the communication dated 23.8.1991 sent by the said Forum. In the circumstances, it is prayed that the delay in filing the appeal, if any, being bona fide and unintentional, be condoned.

IT is pertinent to note here that when the appeal was originally presented beyond time, it was neither accompanied by any application for the condonation of delay nor supported by an affidavit as prescribed. Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 8 of the Punjab Protection Rules, 1987, which governs the procedure for hearing the appeal under Section 15 of the Act reads as under:- Sub-rule 4: "When the appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation as specified in the Act, the memorandum shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit setting forth the fact on which appellant relies to satisfy the State Commission that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation."

Thus, it is obvious that it is imperative for the appellants to apply for the condonation of delay if the appeal is instituted beyond time and such an application shall be accompanied with the memorandum of appeal and it shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. The provision is mandatory which has not been complied with by the appellant. That being so, this application is liable to fail on this statutory ground alone.

Apart from the above, even otherwise there appears to be no adequate ground which may merit the condonation of delay.

MR. B.S. Bindra, learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted that the period of limitation would not run from the date when the impugned order is passed but from the date on which the order is communicated to the aggrieved party and since in the instant case, the impugned order was received by the appellants on26.8.1991, the limitation would run only from that date. It is not possible to accept this submission of MR. Bindra. The proceedings of the District Forum clearly show that the appellant had been appearing in the Court on some dates but on 6.8.1991 when the impugned order was passed neither the appellant nor his Counsel appeared in the Court. The running of the period of limitation would not be stopped merely because the aggrieved party fails to attend the Court on that date. In the circumstances, we find that the appellants were not justified in computing the period of limitation from 26.8.1991 and not from 6.8.1991. We are not satisfied that the appellants have succeeded in making out sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed time so as to entitle them to the extension of period of limitation under the proviso to Section 15 of the Act. There is no explanation, therefore, for the delay between 5.9.1991 to 20.9.1991. In the circumstances, the application under Section 15 of the Act is dismissed. We are also not satisfied that there is any illegality or miscarriage of justice involved in the order passed by the District Forum. On this ground, we dismiss the appeal. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. _________________