Tribunals and Commissions

State of Punjab vs Karnail Singh

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · Decided on 5 January 1994 · Citation: 1994 1 CPR 474 : 1994 2 CPJ 476

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.S.Dewan , R.L.Gupta J.
RESULT
Appeal dismissed
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Judgment

3 paragraphs · 381 words
1.

THIS appeal has been filed by the Opposite-parties against the order of the District Forum, Faridkot dated 11.9.1993 in complaint case No. 228/1992. The appellants have also filed an application under the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short ''the Act'') for condonation of delay of 18 days in filing the appeal in this Commission. It appears from the record that the application for the certified copy of the impugned order was made on 15.9.1993; copy of the order was ready on 4.11.1993 and the same was obtained on 9.11.1993. Proviso to Section 15 of the Act reads as under:- "Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of 30 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period."

The above proviso to Section 15 of the Act is somewhat similar to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is well settled that the existence of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion under the proviso to Section 15 of the Act. A sketchy ground for condonation of delay is stated to be that due to official transaction and lengthy official procedure, early decision for filing the appeal could not be taken. The learned Counsel for the appellants has now urged before us that the appellants are not a ware of the procedure and technicalities regarding the Act as the same is new and the matter was delayed. It is a trite learning that ignorance of law and in particular of provision of limitation can possibly provide no excuse. THIS apart the Act has now been enforced for more than seven years and the pretence that it is new, can hardly hold water.

2.

IN our opinion, the delay of 18 days has not at all been accounted for and no sufficient cause has been made for excusing the delay. After expiry of limitation, the applicant is bound to explain the delay in filing the appeal ''day by day''. This the appellants have singly failed to do so. We therefore, dismiss the application under the proviso to Section 15 of the Act and consequently the appeal is dismissed as barred by time. Appeal dismissed.