Ralla Singh vs State

Teja Singh, C.J.—This order will dispose of Criminal Miscellaneous Nos. 23 and 29 of 1952. Both the petitions related to Ralla Singh who was ordered to be arrested by the Deputy Commissioner on 26-3-1952 but was actually arrested on 31-3-1952. The first petition was made on 9-4-1952 and was admitted by me on 14-4-1952. The second petition was made on 28-4-1952. It appears that though the Deputy Commissioner made a formal order for Ralla Singh''s arrest and he intended to detain him u/s 3, Preventive Detention Act, no grounds of detention were supplied to him. In the Deputy Commissioner''s order of 26-3-1952 certain facts were mentioned and reference was made to the activities of Ralla Singh and others. A copy of the order was also supplied to Ralla Singh but there was nothing to show that the facts and activities to which it referred constituted grounds for Ralla Singh''s detention nor was Ralla Singh informed that he had a right to make a representation. Evidently the Deputy Commissioner realised later that important provisions of law relating to the supply of grounds of detention to detained persons had not been complied with and accordingly he made a fresh order of detention on 16-4-1952 and then supplied grounds of detention to Ralla Singh. It was mentioned in the order of 16-4-1952 that the previous order of detention which was wrongly described as that of 31-3-1952 was revoked.

The following are the grounds of detention:

On 7-1-1951, notorious dacoit Jang''s gang visited a well in the limits of village Todarpur known as Bhamnwala. You, Mihan Singh son of Bhagtoo of village Mavi Sapanwali, Nand Singh and Darbara Singh of village Dulran met the gang and supplied them food; thereafter they had attempted to murder one Mohinder Singh Jat of village Todarpur by gun fire.

On 28-10-1951 you and Mihan Singh of village Mavi Sapanwali met the said Jang''s gang in the jungle of village Bathoi Khurd and supplied them food and drinks.

Again on 22/23-1-1952, you along with Mihan Singh of Mavi Sapanwali met Jang''s gang in the jungle of village Karahali. Pood and milk was supplied to them.

You, Ajmer Singh of Chitera, Nand Singh, Darbara Singh of village Dularan and Mihan Singh of village Mavi Sapanwali met notorious dacoit Jang''s gang on 2-3-1952 at 5 P.M. in Jodhewali Khand (Chitera Jungle). Food was supplied by Nand Singh & Darbara Singh of village Dularan.

The only points that the Petitioner''s counsel urges regarding the grounds are that (1) they were not identical with the facts mentioned in the Deputy Commissioner''s order of 26-3-1952, and (2) that ground No. 1 was vague. As I read the ground No. 1, I do not find anything vague in it. Counsel argues that instead of saying that the Petitioner supplied food etc. to Jang what is stated in the ground is that Jang''s gang was supplied with food and since it is not known who the members of the gang were and whether Jang himself was in the gang or not the whole thing was indefinite and uncertain. The contention appears to be wholly devoid of force because the term "gang" is well-known and when we talk of a certain person''s gang it is understood that it means the gang organised by that person and constituting that person and others. As regards the other point I concede that there is a difference between ground No. 1 and the facts stated in para 1 of the Deputy Commissioner''s order of 26-3-1952, viz. that whereas it is stated in the order of 26-3-1952 that Jang''s gang attempted to murder one Mohinder Singh, a Jat of village Todarpur & it was after this that they were supplied with food by the Petitioner and others, ground No. 1 is to the effect that food was supplied to the gang first and it was after this that the gang attempted to put Mohinder Singh to death. I cannot, however, understand how this difference vitiates the grounds of detention. The suggestion that the said difference indicates that the ground was false or concocted deserves no consideration. In addition it may be mentioned that the mere fact that the grounds on which the detaining authority made an order of detention were not true is not a matter for this Court to go into.

Then it was urged that it was not within the power of the Deputy Commissioner to revoke the previous order of detention that he had made on 31-3-1952. In the order of 16-4-1952 it was mentioned that the previous order was revoked u/s 21, General Clauses Act, but which Act was meant, whether the Patiala General Clauses Act, or the General Clauses Act of India, is not clear from the record. As regards Patiala General Clauses Act, I agree with the Petitioner''s counsel that it did not apply because according to the words there of it relates only to orders etc. made under a Patiala Act while the detention order of 31-3-1952 was made under the Central Preventive Detention Act. As regards the Indian General Clauses Act learned Counsel for the Petitioner emphatically asserts that it has not been applied to the State so far and the learned Advocate General is not in a position to contradict it. This, however, cannot make any difference for the purposes of this case, because in my opinion when an authority has a power to make an order he has also inherent power to revoke the order once made, unless there is an express provision of law to the contrary. No such provision is even alleged and since the order of 31-3-1952 was made by the same Deputy Commissioner he was competent to revoke it. In addition, even if it be conceded for a single moment that it was not within the power of the Deputy Commissioner to revoke the previous order of detention made by him on 31-3-1952 the position would be reduced to this: He made two orders, one on 31-3-1952 and the other on 16-4-1952. In view of the fact that the grounds of detention had not been supplied to the detenu in respect of the first order, that order was inoperative and illegal and the Petitioner could not be kept in detention by virtue thereof. This means that that order was null and void and for practical purposes it did not exist at all and the only order that is now before us is the order of 16-4-1952.

As a last resort Petitioner''s counsel urges that it has not been shown that before passing the order of 16-4-1952 the Deputy Commissioner satisfied himself as regards the necessity of detaining the Petitioner. Counsel contends that when a fresh order is made it is incumbent upon the detaining authority to apply his mind afresh to the facts of the case and if this is not done the presumption is that the detaining authority was not satisfied in the words of Section 3 of the Act and the order of detention is illegal. Now the question whether or not the Deputy Commissioner at the time he passed the second order was satisfied that it was necessary to arrest the Petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public peace and order is a question of fact and if the Petitioner''s position was that such a satisfaction did not exist he should have definitely asserted this fact in the petition, but all that he urged in the petition was that the order was without "genuine satisfaction". I cannot say what the significance of the word "genuine" was, probably it meant that there was satisfaction but it was not real & complete. How it was not real & what made it incomplete is not explained. In any case there is not a word in the petition from which it can be inferred that the Petitioner''s case was that the Deputy Commissioner did not apply his mind to the facts afresh and that he was not satisfied at all. As regards the evidence of satisfaction we have it definitely stated in the documents containing the grounds of detention, a copy of which was supplied to the Petitioner, that the Deputy Commissioner was satisfied that

because of the various activities mentioned to the grounds, it was necessary to prevent the Petitioner from engaging any more in such activities

and it was because of this that his detention was ordered. Then I wish to add that according to the Petitioner''s counsel himself the grounds of detention as supplied to the Petitioner were not identical with the facts stated in the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 26-3-1952. Had they been identical, probably it could have been urged with some sort of plausibility that all that the Deputy Commissioner did was that he made a. fresh order as a matter of routine without scrutinizing the case and without applying his mind to the facts of the case. But the fact that there was some variation in the grounds of detention and in one respect even the order in which the fact were alleged to have taken place was also changed goes to show that the Deputy Commissioner did go into the matter afresh and he passed the new order after he was satisfied of the necessity of it.

For all these reasons I find that there is nothing wrong with the second order of detention and the petition must fail.