J.S. LAKRA vs NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.-/

WHETHER an appeal under Section 15 of the Act lies against the order of the District Forum rejecting an application for restoration of a complaint dismissed in default earlier? This is the significant threshold question in this appeal.

SINCE the question aforesaid is pristinely legal, the facts would pale into relative insignificance and may be noticed with utmost brevity. The appellant had preferred complaint No. 125 of 1991 before the District Forum, Hisar which after some adjournment came up for hearing on the 20th of February, 1992. On the said date, the appellant did not chose to come present whilst the learned Counsel for the opposite party put in appearance and made an application for rejecting the complaint in default. The District Forum noticed that the case had been repeatedly called out and no appearance was being put in on behalf of the appellant and consequently dismissed the complaint for want of prosecution on the date aforesaid. After nearly 21/2 months of the dismissal aforesaid, an application dated the 6th of May, 1992, was moved on behalf of the appellant for the restoration of the complaint. This was strenuously opposed on behalf of the opposite party both on legal and factual grounds. The District Forum in its considered order first opined that there appeared to be no enabling section or rule to restore a complaint dismissed in default. It however, proceeded further to examine the question on its facts and merits and held that the appellant had not come to the District Forum with clean hands and further there was an unexplained delay of 2 months in making the application for restoration, and on this factual position also the application was rejected.

The present appeal has been directed against the aforesaid order dated the 27th of August, 1992. The preliminary question of its very maintainability thus inevitably arises at the very threshold. Mr. Pardeep Bedi, the learned Counsel for the respondent strenuously took up the stand that no appeal is warranted under Section 15 of the Act against an order of the nature aforesaid.

MR. G.S. Bhatia, the learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the present appeal is competent under Section 15 of the Act. With considerable literality, it was urged that the said section envisaged an appeal against any and every order passed by the District Forum. The submission was that whether such an order was merely the rejection of an application or the adjudication on merits of a complaint, the same could be equally the subject-matter of the appeal. Reliance was sought to be placed by way of a somewhat remote analogy on II (1991) CPJ 633 (NC), R.P. Singh v. Janta Store & Ors. and I (1992) CPJ 356, T.P. Chaturvedi v. Deomani Kotedar. At the very outset we must notice that the question herein is of some significance and wider ramification within the consumer jurisdiction. It is not entirely free from difficulty and as yet appears to be res integra, In any case, inspite of repeated opportunities given to the learned Counsel no decision of the National Commission or any other State Commission covering the issue on all fours could be cited before us. Inevitably, the matter has, there- fore, to be examined on the larger scheme and language of the Section and on general principles. Consequently, it would be apt to set out the provisions of Section 15 for facility of reference:- "Appeal-Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order, in such forum and manner as may be prescribed; Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period."

IN seeking the clue to its meaning in the interpretative exercise for the aforesaid section, the larger approach to the question seems not only to be important but indeed crucial. It needs no great erudition to recall that the rigour and the technicalities of the earlier strict rule of grammatical construction have now been considerably mellowed down by, what is called, the schematic approach to the construction of the provisions of a statute. Equally, the object and purpose of the Act as a whole is not to be lost sight by myopically focusing oneself on a single provision thereof, as if it stood in total isolation. We are inclined to the view that the brief Section 15 quoted above is not to be construed as if in a vacuum but as one link in the chain of the other connected sections preceding the same and in the larger mosaic of the statutory pattern of this Act. With this broader perspective in mind, one may read Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the statute together and construe them harmoniously. Section 13 in considerable detail provides for the procedure on the receipt of a complaint by the District Forum. The succeeding Section 14, as its very heading shows, provides in somewhat lesser detail the findings of the District Forum in its final order, after complying with the procedure prescribed. It is in this sequence that Section 15 immediately follows and lays down that any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against it to the State Commission. The reference to the order under Section 14, though not explicit, is implicit in this provision. The intent of the framers seems to be somewhat clear that the substantive right of appeal conferred by Section 15, is directed primarily against an order made by the District Forum under Section 14 of the Act. Even if Section 15 is viewed with strictitude and in relative isolation, the same result would, in essence, ensue. This section talks of an order made by the District Forum and not of "any or every order" made by it. It bears repetition that such an order has a contextual reference to the proceeding Section 14 containing the findings of the District Forum on a complaint preferred before it under Section 12. To construe "an order" as "any order", in Section 15, when carried to logical lengths, would lead to an obvious absurdity. If it were to be so, then every order, whether interlocutory, interim or one merely giving an adjournment or a date made by the District Forum would come within the purview of Section 15. This could hardly be the intent of the framers of the Act. It is well-settled that even where two interpretations are possible the one which leads to absurd or mischievous results has to be necessarily avoided. Therefore, to read Section 15, as laying down that any and every order of whatever nature, passed by the District Forum would become appealable thereunder, appears tous as running patently against the basic canons of construction.

VIEWED from another angle, the somewhat broader question is whether an appeal would lie against the order of the District Forum passed merely on any application. It is worth recalling that the Act and the rules framed thereunder do not in terms prescribed the range and scope of applications which may be made to a District Forum in the course of a trial. In the patent paucity of procedural provisions, there can be myriads of applications which the complainant or the opposite party may have to make before this redressal agency. Would any and every order passed on every application becomes appealable under Section 15? In view of what has been discussed above, we are inclined to answer this question somewhat firmly in the negative.

IN appraising the primal submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant one has equally to recall the hallowed rule that the right of appeal is a pure creature of the statute. There is no inherent or natural right to a first appeal. If the Parliament in its wisdom and the trainers of the rules have not provided any appeal from an order on an application, it cannot be created on the ground that a particular order passed on an application is onerous in nature. The best Judge of the provisions of substantive right of appeal is the Legislature and where it has not done so, it is not for the Courts to create one on the alleged ground of the onerous nature of the order or for reasons of compassion or sentiment. As already been noticed earlier, the Counsel were unable to cite precedent which covers the issue directly. However, the learned Counsel for the respondent Mr. Pardeep Bedi''s reliance on II (1991) CPJ 429, Kohinoor Carpets Panipat & Ors. v. Mr. Rajinder Arora is worthy of reference. Therein, the point in issue which came up for consideration before this Commission was whether an appeal was maintainable against the imposition of penalty by the District Forum under Section 27 of the Act. After an exhaustive discussion on principles and precedent it was held as follows: - "To conclude, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the negative and it is held that no appeal under Section 15 lies against the imposition of penalty by the District Forum in exercise of its power under Section 27 above."

There seems to be no gain-saying the fact that the conclusion aforesaid, and the discussion in the case would strongly go to buttress the stand taken on behalf of the opposite party that herein as well, no appeal is maintainable.

It remains to advert to the somewhat tenuous reliance of the learned Counsel for the appellants on precedents noticed above. A bare reference to the short order on facts recorded by the National Commission in R.P. Singh v. Janta Store &. Ors. (supra) would show that the same does not in any way aid or advance the stand of the appellants. Indeed a close perusal of the same may in fact boom-rang upon the appellants'' case. Therein, an appeal was dismissed in default by the State Commission of Uttar Pradesh and significantly it was challenged and entertained only by way of a revision petition before the National Commission. This would tend to indicate that no appeal in such a situation would lie and any remedy if at all would have to be put in the narrow confines of the revisional jurisdiction.

EQUALLY Counsel''s reliance on T.P. Chaturvedi v. Deomani Kothdar (supra) is wholly wide off the mark. A reading of the order herein would make it manifest that the issue before us was not even remotely raised far from being adjudicated there upon. The mere fact that two appeals had been entertained by the State Commission becomes virtually irrelevant to the legal question before us. It is well-settled that the ratio of a judgment is the principle which is decided thereby and not any or every inference remotely sought therefrom. To conclude, the answer to the question posed at the very outset, is therefore, rendered in the negative. It is held that no appeal under Section 15 of the Act lies against the order of the District Forum merely rejecting an application for restoration of a complaint dismissed in default earlier.

IN view of the aforesaid ratio, the present appeal therefore, must be held as not maintainable at the very threshold. Appeal dismissed.