Kanailal Banerjee and Another vs Dasu Ghose and Others

Sen, J.—These are seven revision-al applications u/s 115 of the CPC against the orders of the Munsif, 1st Court, Krishna-gar, rejecting objections of the contesting defendants as to the valuation of the suit and sufficiency of the court-fees paid on the plaint. The suits in question are Title Suits Nos. 84 to 90 of 1952 of the Munsif, 1st Court, Krishnagar. The defendants are the petitioners in this court. The petitioners as plaintiffs in the first instance instituted certain suits against the opposite parties for their ejectment from the disputed lands alleging that the opposite parties are non-occupancy raiyats These suits were decreed on compromise. Suits Nos. 84 to 90 were filed by the opposite parties, the raiyats in question, for setting aside the compromise decrees on the declaration that they were fraudulent, illegal and inoperative and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from putting the decrees into execution. The relief for setting aside each decree was valued at the figure at which the decree sought to be set aside was valued. The original suits by the present petitioners ere suits by the landlords u/s 7 (xi) (cc), that is, for recovery of immovable property from a tenant including a tenant holding over after the determination of a tenancy and the valuation was one year''s rent. In the present case accordingly the relief for setting aside the decree was also valued at one year''s rent and the permanent injunction for restraining the principal defendants, that is the present petitioners, from putting the present decree into execution was valued at Rs. 5 only. The petitioners, the contesting defendants in the courts below, objected that the suit had not been correctly valued because the opposite parties were seeking to set aside the decrees in execution of which they might be altogether ejected from the lands in their possession and that, accordingly, the suit should be valued according to the value of the land.

The learned Munsif rejected the contention and held on the analogy of section 7 (xi) (e) that the suits are correctly valued at the figure of one year''s rent and the learned Munsif further observed that it was equitable that in the suits to set aside the compromise decrees the same court-fees should be paid as were paid for the decrees sought to be set aside. On this finding objection of the contestesting defendants, the present petitioners, was rejected. The contesting defendants as petitioners have filed these revisional applications contending that the learned Munsif was wrong in deciding that the valuation of the suit and the court-fees were sufficient.

Two of the suits, viz., Title Suit No. 84 of 1952 and Title. Suit No. 89 of 1952 have since been dismissed on compromise and the corresponding Rules Nos. 3017 and 3026 have, therefore, become infructuous. As to the remaining five Rules Mr. Mitter appearing on behalf of the petitioners has urged that section 7 (xi) (e) can have no application because that is a suit by the tenant to recover the occupancy of immovable property from which the tenant had been illegally ejected by the landlord, and in the present case, although compromise decrees for ejectment had been obtained, the tenant had not been ejected. Mr. Mitter has referred to the ruling in the case of Mir Akhtar Hossain v. Gurupada Haldar (1) (44 C.W. N. 591) of which the head-note runs as follows : In a suit for a permanent injunction restraining; the defendant from executing a decree against certain land in possession of the plaintiff, the latter is not entitled to put an arbitrary valuation nor is an objective standard unavailable. On the other hand, the proper value of the suit is not the value of the land simpliciter, but the difference between the value to the plaintiff of the land, as it stands, with its exposure to the risk of execution, and the value when a permanent injunction averting- execution has been obtained.

This was a decision of a single Judge and the learned Judge himself observed that there might be some difficulty in arriving at a proper valuation in connection with a matter of this sort, but his Lordship observed that he did not think it would be impossible to do so, because people acquainted with the land would probably be in a position to estimate the approximate value of the land as it stood, and as it would be if the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining a permanent injunction restraining the execution of the decree for possession. With due respect I must observe that such an estimate of the approximate value of the land with the risk of execution of the decree for possession can only be a vague estimate. As was observed by the Full Bench in the case of The Narayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Society Ltd. in liquidation v. Maulvi Mafijuddin Ahmed (2) (38 C.W. N. 589) so long as there are no specific rules framed under the Suits Valuation Act it is difficult to assess the proper value of the suits in such cases, and, therefore, the plaintiff''s value must be accepted, for the suits come u/s 7(iv) (c) where the plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation subject to the provisions of section 8C. Section 8C authorises the Court to hold an enquiry as to the proper valuation, but where the valuation must necessarily be vague, the Court would have no objective standard for arriving at the proper valuation and, therefore, it would be in my opinion useless to remand the suit for holding an enquiry in each case u/s 8C of the Court-Fees Act. Further, though I must agree with Mr. Mitter that section 7(xi) (e) does not in terms apply, the principle of that clause may be applied. If the tenant had been ejected in execution of the compromise decree, then if he challenged the decree as tainted by fraud and therefore, illegal, the ejectment would also be illegal and, therefore, he would be entitled to maintain the suit u/s 7(xi) (e) of the Court-fees Act by valuing the suit at the figure of the annual rent only. Where, therefore, the tenant had not yet been ejected in execution of the compromise decree which is challenged to be illegal, it would be inequitable to require him to pay any more fee than on the figure of one year''s rent.

Accordingly, these Rules are discharged. No order is, however, made as to costs of these Rules.