Manonit Lakra, S/o Late Abnejar Lakra vs State Of Jharkhand

Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J

The instant Civil Miscellaneous Petition has been filed for restoration of C.M.P. No. 89 of 2021 which was dismissed on account of non-prosecution vide order dated 14.07.2023.

C.M.P. No. 89 of 2021 was also filed for restoration of W.P.(C) No. 1441 of 2011 which was dismissed on 31.08.2015. Meaning thereby, the original miscellaneous petition was filed for restoration after six years of the dismissal of the said writ petition.

It is submitted by the learned for the petitioner that the present civil miscellaneous petition has been filed after a delay of 394 days. It is further submitted that petitioner’s son is suffering from renal disease and was undergoing dialysis since December 2020, therefore, civil miscellaneous petition for restoration could not be filed within time. It is argued by the learned counsel that the delay in preferring the civil miscellaneous petition for restoration was on the account of laches on the part of the then conducting counsel. Reliance is placed on 2010 1 SCC 391 for sympathetically considering civil miscellaneous petition for restoration.

Matter for consideration is whether the petitioner has succeeded to bring on record any sufficient cause for condonation of delay in preferring the instant civil miscellaneous petition for restoration of civil miscellaneous petition No. 89 of 2021.

There is a public policy for having limitation law. The intention in accepting the concept of limitation is that “controversies are restricted to a fixed period of time, lest they should become immortal while men are mortal.” This statutory restriction after a certain period of time gives a status to enforce an existing right. Principles that are to be considered in condonation application under Section 5 is exposited in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn. & Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 459 which is extracted below,

“14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.

The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate—Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353] , N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123 : JT (1998) 6 SC 242] and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil [(2001) 9 SCC 106] .

In Noor Mohammed v. Jetha Nand & Anr., (2013) 5 SCC 202 the Apex Court dwelt on the effect of delays caused in the adjudicatory process by any of the party.

An attitude of indifference can neither be appreciated nor tolerated. Therefore, the serviceability of the institution gains significance. That is the command of the Majesty of Law and none should make any maladroit effort to create a concavity in the same. Procrastination, whether at the individual or institutional level, is a systemic disorder. Its corrosive effect and impact is like a disorderly state of the physical frame of a man suffering from an incurable and fast progressive malignancy. Delay either by the functionaries of the court or the members of the Bar significantly exhibits indolence and one can aphoristically say, borrowing a line from Southwell “creeping snails have the weakest force” [ Robert Southwell, “Loss in Delay”, in William B. Turnbull (Ed.), The Poetical Works of the Rev. Robert Southwell (John Russell Smith, London 1856), p. 60.] . Slightly more than five decades back, talking about the responsibility of the lawyers, Nizer Louis had put thus:

“I consider it a lawyer's task to bring calm and confidence to the distressed client. Almost everyone who comes to a law office is emotionally affected by a problem. It is only a matter of degree and of the client's inner resources to withstand the pressure.” [ Nizer Louis, My Life in Court (Doubleday & Co. Inc., New York 1961), p. 213]

A few lines from the illustrious Justice Frankfurter is fruitful to recapitulate:

“I think a person who throughout his life is nothing but a practising lawyer fulfils a very great and essential function in the life of society. Think of the responsibilities on the one hand, and the satisfaction on the other, to be a lawyer in the true sense.” [ Felix Frankfurter, “Proceedings in Honor of Mr Justice Frankfurter and Distinguished Allumni, Occasional Pamphlet No. 3” (Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 1960), pp. 4-5]

In a democratic set-up, intrinsic and embedded faith in the adjudicatory system is of seminal and pivotal concern. Delay gradually declines the citizenry faith in the system. It is the faith and faith alone that keeps the system alive. It provides oxygen constantly. Fragmentation of faith has the effect-potentiality to bring in a state of cataclysm where justice may become a casualty. A litigant expects a reasoned verdict from a temperate Judge but does not intend to and, rightly so, to guillotine much of time at the altar of reasons. Timely delivery of justice keeps the faith ingrained and establishes the sustained stability. Access to speedy justice is regarded as a human right which is deeply rooted in the foundational concept of democracy and such a right is not only the creation of law but also a natural right. This right can be fully ripened by the requisite commitment of all concerned with the system. It cannot be regarded as a facet of Utopianism because such a thought is likely to make the right a mirage losing the centrality of purpose. Therefore, whoever has a role to play in the justice-dispensation system cannot be allowed to remotely conceive of a casual approach.”

In the present case, as noted above, there is a delay of over 394 days in filing the latest civil miscellaneous petition for restoration, which itself was filed nearly six years after the dismissal of an earlier writ petition. Successive applications for restoration are being filed after substantial delays, each time citing one reason or another. This pattern indicates a lack of diligence in pursuing legal remedies and results in unnecessary consumption of the Court’s time.

Having regard to the facts discussed, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has failed to furnish sufficient cause to justify the delay in filing the restoration petition. Moreover, the petitioner’s conduct reveals a consistent pattern of delay and laxity, which disentitles him to any equitable relief, including condonation of delay.

Application for condonation of delay in preferring the restoration application is rejected.

Consequently, civil miscellaneous petition stands dismissed.

I.A. is dismissed accordingly.