Nanhu Prasad Yadav vs District Magistrate Gonda and Others

Devendra Kumar Arora, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.

By means of present writ petition, the Petitioner is challenging the selection of opposite party No. 5 on the post of Shiksha Mitra, which was made in the year 2005.

More than five years have passed. No reason has been explained by learned Counsel for the Petitioner for not approaching the Court at the relevant time.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case reported in S.S. Balu and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, while examining the issue of delay, pleased to observe as under:

It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15.01.2002. The Appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party-Respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ Petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the Appellants at this stage.

Similarly, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the matter of Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Yunus (Baboobhai) A Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary and Others, held:

Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extra ordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Controller of Imports and Exports. Of Course, the discretion has to be exercise judicially and reasonably.

In the matter of State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 556 it is observed:

The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised and unreasonable delay, it may have the effect or inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weights with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.

In view of the above, this writ petition suffers from latches and does not find any good ground for interference with the appointment of opposite party No. 5 after the lapse of about 6 years.

The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.