Ankita Yadav vs State of U.P. and Others

Devendra Kumar Arora, J.—By means of present writ petition, the Petitioner is seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the selection and appointment of opposite party No. 6 on the post of Shiksha Mitra for Bal Primary School, Pathakpur, Asoha, District-Unnao. The Petitioner further seeks a writ in the nature of mandamus for commanding the opposite parties to allow the Petitioner to resume his duty on the post of Shiksha Mitra at Bal, Primary School, Pathakpur, Asoha, District-Unnao in the interest of justice.

The submission of learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that in the year 2003 an advertisement was published for appointment on the post of Shiksha Mitra for Primary School, Pathakpur, Asoha, District-Unnao. The Petitioner along with several other candidates applied for the said post and finally selected by opposite parties. The Petitioner completed thirty days'' training for the post of Shiksha Mitra w.e.f. 16.6.2003 to 15.07.2003 at District Education and Training Institute, Unnao. The further submission of learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that opposite party No. 5 passed a resolution on 03.07.2004 whereby warning was given to the Petitioner to present herself in the school on 05.02.2005 and in case she does not come to the school, then another selection on the post of Shiksha Mitra shall be made. Subsequently, by means of resolution dated 10.11.2005 the earlier resolution was recalled by the village level Education Committee taking into consideration the illness and pregnancy of the Petitioner and it was resolved that the Petitioner be permitted to join on the post. The Petitioner was on maternity leave w.e.f. 13.07.2004 to 08.11.2005 and thereafter on 11.11.2005 and 02.12.2005. In the meantime, the post of Shiksha Mitra was re-advertised on 08.11.2005 and thereafter opposite party No. 6 was selected and appointed.

Now by means of present writ petition, the Petitioner wants to challenge the selection and appointment of opposite party No. 6 made in the year 2005. No reason has been explained for approaching this Court after the lapse of about six years.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case reported in S.S. Balu and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, while examining the issue of delay pleased to observe as under:

It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15.01.2002. The Appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party-Respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ Petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the Appellants at this stage.

Similarly, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the matter of Yunus (Baboobhai) A Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary and Others, held:

Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extra ordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Controller of Imports and Exports. Of Course, the discretion has to be exercise judicially and reasonably.

In the matter of State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 556 it is observed:

The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised and unreasonable delay, it may have the effect or inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weights with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.

I have considered the arguments of learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record.

Admittedly, the Petitioner was kept silent after fresh selection of opposite party No. 6 on the post of Shiksha Mitra and now approached this Court by means of present writ petition. This Court does not find any good ground to interfere with the appointment of opposite party No. 6.

In view of the above, this writ petition suffers from latches and has no merit. It is accordingly dismissed.