Niranjan Prodhan vs Jogendra Nath Prodhan

Lahiri, J.—The only question which falls for determination in this Rule is whether before the amendment of sub-section (3) of section 7 of the West Bengal Bargadars Act by the Bargadar Amendment Act I of 1953, which came into operation on the 11th March, 1953, the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board constituted under the aforesaid Act had jurisdiction to make an award or order for payment of the price of owner''s share of the bhag produce. The plaintiff instituted the suit out of which this Rule arises for the recovery of price of her share of barga produce on the 7th March, 1952. That suit terminated in a decree on the 10th November, 1952. On the 11th March, 1953, sub-section (3) of section 7 of the West Bengal Bargadars Act was amended by Act I of 1953 and by this amendment a proviso was added which runs as follows:

Provided that where the dispute is in respect of the division or delivery of the produce, the Board shall specify the money which shall be payable under the award or the order, in default of the delivery of the share of the produce, as being the value of such share

After obtaining the decree the plaintiff transferred it to the present petitioner Niranjan Pradhan who filed an application for execution. In the executing Court an objection was raised on behalf of the bargadar to the effect that the decree was without jurisdiction because the claim in the suit was for recovery of the price of bhag paddy which could be decided only by the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board which had been established in this local area on the 18th October, 1952 and as such under the terms of section 9(2) of the West Bengal Bargadars Act, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The executing Court allowed this objection and dismissed the execution case and against that order the petitioner who is a transferee of the decree has obtained the present Rule u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act.

There can be no question that if the suit which was instituted by the plaintiff came under one of the clauses enumerated in section 7(1) of the Bargadars Act, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. But Mr. Banerjee appearing for the petitioner has contended that prior to the amendment of 1953, the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board had jurisdiction to decide every dispute between the bargadar and owner with regard to "the division or delivery of the produce" in kind only. According to Mr. Banerjee u/s 7(1) as it stood before the amendment of 1953, the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board had no jurisdiction to determine a dispute relating to division or delivery of the produce in cash and this power was conferred on the Board for the first time by the West Bengal Bargadars Amendment Act of 1953, which I have already quoted above. Under sub-section (3) of section 7 the decision of the Board is required to be in the form of an award where the dispute is in respect of the division of the produce and in other cases in the form of an order. Reading the different provisions of section 7 it seems that originally the power of the Board was confined to the division of delivery of the produce in kind only. But Mr. Roy appearing for the opposite party has invited my attention to the provisions of section 15 of the Act which is to the following effect:

Any money payable under an award or order made under this Act shall be recoverable as an arrear of public demand.

Section 15, therefore, contemplates that money may be payable under an award or an order. The suit out of which the present Rule arises relates to a dispute regarding division and delivery of the plaintiff''s share of the barga produce and instead of asking for a decree for payment in kind the plaintiff asked for payment of the price of the bhag produce. Mr. Roy accordingly argues that an award or order could have been made in respect of the plaintiff''s claim if the present dispute had been decided by the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board and the amount of Rs. 153]- which had been decreed in favour of the plaintiff could have been included in the award or order that might have been passed by the Board. To my mind the combined effect of section 7(3) as it stood before the Amendment Act of 1953 and section 15 of the West Bengal Bargadars Act is that pecuniary compensation in lieu of the plaintiff''s share of the barga produce could have been awarded by the Board even before the introduction of the amendment to section 7 by the Amendment Act I of 1953. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 7 read by itself lends support to the petitioner''s contention that the power of the Board was confined to the division or delivery of the produce in kind only. But read with section 15 it means that the Board had the power to make an award for the division and an order for the delivery of the produce either in cash or in kind.

The next point that requires consideration is what was the object of the amendment which was introduced in sub-section (3) of section 7 by the Amendment Act of 1953. On behalf of the petitioner it has been contended that by this amendment the power was for the first time conferred upon the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board to make an order for payment of the price of the produce in cash. But, as I have already said, section 15 which was in the Act even before the amendment of 1953 conferred that power on the Board even before that day. The only effect of the amendment therefore seems to be this that by this amendment the Legislature wanted to make it obligatory on the Board to specify the money which is equivalent to the share of the barga produce payable to the owner in every case. There might have been cases where the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board made an award for division or an order for delivery of the produce in kind only and that might have led to considerable difficulties at the stage of execution and in order to remove those difficulties the legislature required the Board to specify in every case the money which shall be payable under the award or the order in default of delivery of the share of the produce in kind. I am not, therefore, prepared to accept the argument of the petitioner that by this amendment the Board was for the first time empowered to make an order for delivery of the produce in cash.

Mr. Roy appearing for the opposite party has invited my attention to the case of Krishna Chandra Vs. Panchu Ghosh and Others, where Sen, J., held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit for recovery of bhag paddy which was pending on the date on which the West Bengal Bargadars Act came into force and the dispute must be referred to the Board. In this case the suit was for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 89 |-as representing the value of bhag paddy and so it might have been contended in that case, as has been con-, tended before me, that the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board had no jurisdiction to make an order for payment of money in lieu of the plaintiff''s share of the bhag produce. But that point was not raised in that case and so I am not prepared to accept this decision as an authority on the point which has been raised before me in the present case. The second case which was relied upon by Mr. Roy appearing for the opposite party is that of Md. Ismail Miah v. Tom Munda (2) ( 59 C.W.N. 658), where Das Gupta and Debabrata Mookerjee, JJ., held that under the terms of section 9(2) of the West Bengal Bargadars Act the Civil-Court was precluded from entertaining any suit which came under any of the clauses of sub-section (1) of section 7, even where the land is situate in an area where no Bhag Chas Conciliation Board has been established by the Government. This decision was re-affirmed by Das Gupta and Guha, JJ., in the case of Adhar Chandra Mandal v. Bishnupada Gure, (3) (60 C.W.N. 351), where their Lordships dissented from certain decisions of single Judge of this Court to the effect that if there is no Board established in the area where the land is situate the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted by section 9(2). But these two Bench decisions do not affect the point which has been raised before me and they are of no assistance so far as the power of the Board to make an order for payment of money is concerned. In the case before me the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board was established in the area where the land is situate as will appear from the judgment of the learned Small Cause Court Judge which states that the "Calcutta Gazette", dated October 18, 1951, shows that the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board was appointed in Police Station Kotowali. In view of the interpretation which I have placed upon the different provisions of section 7 and section 15 of the West Bengal Bargadars Act, I think the point raised by the petitioner fails and this Rule stands discharged. But there will be no order as to costs.