Tiratabasini Dasl vs Bilat Ali Mondal and Others

Das, J.—This is an application in revision u/s 115 of the CPC against an appellate order passed by Mr. D. N. Das Gupta, learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Court. Alipore, affirming an order of a learned Munsif directing the return of a plaints filed by the petitioner for recovery of the price of bhag produce due in his share. The plaintiff''s allegation is that in the year 1353 B.S. (1946-47), the defendants cultivated his land under the tern known as barga, but failed to deliver the produce in that year as stipulated. The plaintiff therefore prayed for recovery of the price of the produce due in his share. It is not disputed that the dispute over the delivery of the bhag produce arose in the year, 1353 B.S. (1946-47).

The defence to the suit inter alia, is that the suit is not maintainable in a civil court, it being barred under the provisions of section 9 of the West Bengal Bargadars Act (Act II of 1950)

The Bargadars Act was preceded by the West Bengal Ordinance, X of 1940, which was in similar terms. The Ordinance came into force on the 14th of November, 1949. In pursuance of that Ordinance, a Bhag Conciliation Board was established on the 29th of December, 1949, for the local area within which the disputed land is situate. It is not disputed that the appointment of the Bhag Conciliation Board under the Ordinance of 1949, is effective by force of section 20 of the Bargadars Act of 1950, at present. The Question is whether section 9 bars the suit. Section 9(2) provides that "no court shall entertain any suit or any proceeding whatsoever in respect of a matter required under sub-section 1 of section 7 to be decided by a Board referred to in that sub-Section 7(1) (a) provides for a determination by the Board of any dispute relating to the division of produce between the Bhagdar and the owner. The question is whether the dispute referred to in section 7(1) (a) includes a dispute which arose before the promulgation of Ordinance X of. 1949 and necessarily, of the West Bengal Act II of 1950. Prima facie an Act of a Legislature is prospective and speaks from the date of its coming into force, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary or a necessary intendment in the Act in question. There is nothing either in the Ordinance of 1949 or in the Act of 1950 which contains an express provision or a necessary intendment to the contrary. On the other hand, section 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b) and 7(1) (c) and section 8 of the Bargadars Act contemplate a state of events which can only occur after the Statute came into operation. These sections reinforce the general rule that an Act including the Bargadars Act 1950, must be taken to operate prospectively.

Mr. Acharya on behalf of the opposite parties has strongly relied on the fact that the Act speaks of "any" dispute but this argument overlooks the fact that Acts can only operate on disputes which occur after the Act came into operation. In this case, it is undisputed that the present dispute, which occurred in 1946-47, does not come within section 7(1)(a). The plaintiff had a valid cause of action, and a right to sue in civil court in consequence of that dispute. That right, in my opinion, has not been taken away by section9(2) of the West Bengal Act II of 1950. The courts below failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them in not entertaining the plaint.

The result is that the decisions of the learned Subordinate Judge as also of the learned Munsif are set aside and this case remitted to the trial court for proceeding with the suit in accordance with law. This Rule is made absolute. The plaintiff petitioner is entitled to his costs in this Court and in the courts below.