Soudamini Dasi vs Akanuddin Sheikh

P.N. Mookerjee, J.—This Rule was obtained by the Petitioner who was the Plaintiff in the instant suit for recovery of bhag produce for the years 1358 to 1360 B.S. The suit was instituted in the Civil Court. The defence was that the suit was not maintainable and the Plaintiff''s remedy, if any, was before the Bhagchash Conciliation Board.

The learned Munsif, upon the view that Section 7 of the Bargadars Act, which was in force at the time, ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in matters like the present and vested the same in the Bhagchash Conciliation Board, held that the suit was not triable by the Civil Court and directed return of the plaint to the filing lawyer for presentation to the Bhagchash Conciliation Board.

On appeal, the said decision was affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge in view of the decision of this Court, reported in Md. Ismail Miah v. Tom Munda (1954) 59 C.W.N. 658 although the learned Judge was inclined to hold the contrary and agreed with the view, expressed by Bachawat and Guha Ray, JJ. in their referring judgment to the Full Bench in Full Bench Reference No. 1 of 1956. The matter then was taken up to this Court by the unsuccessful Plaintiff and the present Rule was obtained.

In view of the said Full Bench Reference and the importance of the question and, particularly, the conflict in the opinions of this Court in the two Division Benches, referred to above, the matter was referred by the sitting single Judge to the Division Bench. The above Full Bench Reference has since been answered in Mahendra Nath Roy Vs. Delraddi Chakdar and Another, and the Division Bench decision in Md. Ismail Miah''s case (1) has been held to be wrong and overruled. The Full Bench has categorically stated in its judgment that having regard to the admitted fact that, on the date of the institution of the suit, no Bhagchash Conciliation Board has been established by the State Government, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the. suit for the bhag produce would not be barred.

Prima facie, on that decision, the instant suit would be entertain-able by the Civil Court as admittedly here, too, no Board has been established for the local area on the date, when the suit was instituted by the Plaintiff. It is pointed out, however, on behalf of the opposite party that, although there was no Board established on the date of institution of the suit, namely, on April 15, 1954, a Board actually came to be established for the local area in question on September 2, 1954, while the suit was pending in the trial Court by or under a notification, dated September 2, 1954.

In view of the above, it is contended that, whatever might have been the position at the date of the institution of the suit, the subsequent establishment of the Board during the pendency of the suit ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the Plaintiff could proceed, since the said establishment of the Board, only before the said Tribunal. We are unable to accept this contention.

In the Full Bench decision, stress appears to have been laid on the date of institution of the suit as the relevant date or point of time. On the facts before us, on the date of establishment of the Board, the instant suit was a pending suit. The Civil Court had assumed jurisdiction to entertain this suit validly on the date of its institution. That jurisdiction, in our opinion, could not be taken away or ousted in the absence of some provision, either express or carrying necessary implication. There is no provision in the relevant Act, pointing to the same result or for transfer of pending proceedings to the Board on its establishment, as is usually done in similar legislations, where the intention of the Legislature is to that effect. We would, accordingly, held that the learned Munsif had full jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit and continued to have that jurisdiction during the entire career of the proceedings before him in spite of the establishment of the Board in the interval, that is, during the continuance of the said proceedings.

In the above view, we would make this Rule absolute, set aside the impugned orders of the two Courts below, directing return of the plaint for presentation to the said Tribunal, and direct the learned Munsif to try this suit in accordance with law in the light of the observations made in this judgment.

There will be no order for costs in this Rule.

Let the records go down as quickly as possible.

S.K. Chakravarti, J.

I agree.