P. Rajesh Kumar vs Kunhabdulla

G. Girish, J

The concurrent findings of conviction and sentence recorded by the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate-II, Vatakara, and the Additional Sessions Court, Kozhikode, in a private complaint filed by the first respondent against the petitioner herein alleging the commission of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881(in short, ‘Act’), are under challenge in this revision petition. The petitioner was convicted and sentenced by the learned Magistrate in C.C.No.8/2013 to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and fine of Rs.3,69,750/- with a default clause of simple imprisonment for two months. It was also directed that the fine amount shall be paid to the complainant who is the first respondent herein. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, as per the judgment dated 20.08.2013 in Crl.A.No.242/2013, upheld the above verdict. In the present revision petition, the petitioner would contend that the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court went wrong in their verdicts.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the first respondent.

The Trial Court relied on the evidence of the complainant and one witness as PW1 and PW2, and the documents marked as Exts P1 to P5 for arriving at the finding that the accused committed the offence under Section 138 of the Act. The evidence tendered by the accused through the testimonies of DW1 to DW3 had also been dealt with in the impugned judgment of the Trial Court which held that the accused could not probabilise his defence that the complaint was filed misusing the signed blank cheque handed over by him as the security in another transaction. In appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had made a re-appraisal of the evidence of the complainant as well as the evidence of the accused and found that the complainant has successfully established his case, and that there was no consistent case brought out by the accused to dislodge the logical conclusion which could be drawn from the evidence adduced by the complainant. On going through the impugned judgments of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, I find no reason to hold that the said Courts improperly and perversely rejected admissible evidence or accepted evidence which were not admissible. There is absolutely no manifest illegality, impropriety or error in the appreciation of evidence and the conclusions drawn by the courts below. In the above circumstances, it is not possible for this Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, in this revision proceedings.

The proposition of law upon the scope of interference in revision, is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

In State of Kerala v. Jathadevan Namboodiri : AIR 1999 SC 981, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.

In Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke & Anr : 2015 (3) SCC 123, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:

Revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 of Cr.PC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.

Referring the above dictums, the Apex Court has observed in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda : 2018 (8) SCC 165 as follows:

Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke and others, 2015 (3) SCC 123. This Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in paragraph 14:

:14.....Unless  the  order  passed  by  the  Magistrate  is  perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.

The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

Going by the law laid down by the Apex Court in the above regard on the scope of interference in revision, it has to be concluded that the findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court in the matter involved in this case are not liable to be unsettled. The sentence awarded by the courts below is also perfectly justifiable, and warrants no interference.

In the result, the revision petition is hereby dismissed.