SUMAN OBEROI vs PRUDENTIAL CAPITAL MARKET LTD

THE present appeal filed by the appellant under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), is directed against order dated 1.2.1998, passed by District Forum No. III in Complaint Case No. 1617/97 - entitled Ms. Suman Oberoi v. Prudential Capital Market Limited, and subsequent order dated 4.2.2000, passed by the same District Forum in Case No. M/934/99/1617/97 also between the same parties.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the appellant had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act before the District Forum alleging non-payment of the FDR amount together with interest by the respondent even after the date of maturity. THE complaint, filed by the appellant, was allowed by the District Forum vide order dated 1.2.1998, being impugned in the present proceedings and the District Forum directed the respondent to pay the FDR amount to the appellant as per the orders of the Company Law Board dated 27.5.1998. It was also directed in the impugned orders that in the event of default, action under Section 27 of the Act might be initiated. THE subsequent order dated 4.2.2000, also being impugned in the present proceedings, has been passed on a subsequent application, filed by the appellant. THE order dated 4.2.2000 simply states that as the appellant had received the 1st instalment as per the orders of the Company Law Board, no further action was required. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, a person aggrieved by a order, made by the District Forum, can prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. Admittedly, the present appeal has not been filed within the prescribed period of 30 days because the first order was passed on 1.2.1998 and the subsequent order was passed on 4.2.2000 whereas, the present appeal, has been filed on 13.3.2000 i.e., much after the expiry of the period of 30 days. Proviso to Section 15 of the Act provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the abovesaid period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the abovesaid period. Alongwith the appeal, filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, no application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, had been filed and on 23.5.2000, the Authorised Representative of the appellant made a request that the appellant would like to file an application seeking condonation of dealy in filing the present appeal. Thereafter the Authorised Representative of the appellant on has filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal.

The question requiring consideration at the threshold is as to whether the appellant has shown ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the appeal in time within the meaning of proviso to Section 15 of the Act.

THE words ''sufficient cause'', occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. As per the settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'', though deserves to receive a liberal interpretation, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though, no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case, yet, again, as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied. If the above criterion is applied to the present case, it is noticed that the first order was passed on 1.2.1998 i.e., more than 2 years back and the second order was passed on 4.2.2000. In the application, seeking condonation of delay, no cause, what to say ''sufficient cause'' has been shown. In the abovesaid application it is simply stated that the application (appeal) could not be filed earlier as the appellant had fallen sick and was able to file the application (appeal) on 13.3.2000. No proof whatsoever with regard to the alleged illness or nature and duration of illness has been filed. There is not even a supporting affidavit, in support of the above averment made in the application. It has been stated in the application that delay in filing the appeal, be condoned as a ''special case''. Moreover, the earlier order, also being impugned in the present proceedings, as already stated, was passed more than two years back, i.e. 1.2.1998. No explanation whatsoever has been offered in the abovesaid application for the inordinate delay from 1.2.1998 to 13.3.2000. It has been held by the National Commission in case Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, reported as III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-1996 CONSUMER 2731 (NS), that proof of ''sufficient cause'' is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion and delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity.

IN the presence of the above facts and the position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the word ''sufficient cause'', it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence or want of bona fides on the part of the appellant. IN our opinion, the appellant has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay and, therefore, the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal, is hereby rejected. The present appeal, filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation, is also devoid of substance on merits. The earlier order was passed by the learned District Forum on 1.2.1998, directing the respondent to pay the amount in question to the appellant in terms of the order of the Company Law Board. Thereafter, the appellant has received the instalments in terms of the orders of the Company Law Board which is evident from the order dated 4.2.2000 being impugned in the present proceedings. The appellant having accepted the order, now cannot be permitted at this stage to agitate the same in the present proceedings. In case, it is noticed by the appellant that there is any breach of the orders of the District Forum, in that event, the appellant is at liberty to move an appropriate application before the District Forum in terms of the order dated 1.2.1998. Thus, viewed from all angles, the present appeal filed by the appellant, is devoid of substance. The same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.

THE appeal stands disposed of in above terms. Appeal dismissed in limine.