Siri Ram vs State of Haryana

Iqbal Singh, J.

This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ''the Code'') has been filed by Siri Ram (petitioner) seeking the quashing of order dated 23.5.1986 (Annexure P1) and the order dated 5.2.1988 (Annexure P2) passed by Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kaithal.

On 29.8.1984, M.R. Sharma, Government Food Inspector, Kaithal (hereinafter referred to as ''the complainant'') in the area of New Sabzi Mandi, Kaithal, took a sample of coloured sweet Golian (toffees) from Siri Ram (petitioner). On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis of the sample to the effect that the same was adulterated, the complainant filed the complaint against the petitioner in the Court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kaithal, on 19.10.1984.

After the complainant led the precharge evidence, the learned Magistrate framed the charge (Annexure P1) on 23.5.1986 against the petitioner and the case was fixed for aftercharge evidence of the complainant. On 5.2.1988, the learned Magistrate, complying with the provisions of Section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), ordered the trial of the accused in a summary way vide order Annexure P2.

None has appeared on behalf of the petitioner. I have heard Mr. Raman Gaur, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondent and have carefully gone through the records of the case.

The relevant provisions of Section 16A of the Act, for facility of reference, are reproduced as under :

"16A. Power of Court to try cases summarily. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under subsection (1) of Section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial:

Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year:

Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code."

Section 16A was introduced by the Parliament in the Act with effect from 1.4.1976 by Amending Act 34 of 1976. Admittedly, earlier the learned Magistrate had not complied with the provisions of Section 16A of the Act and had framed the charge vide order dated 23.5.1986 (Annexure P1) and tried the case as a warrant case. However, vide order dated 5.2.1988 (Annexure P2) the learned Magistrate, in compliance with the provisions of Section 16A of the Act, ordered for the trial of the case in a summary way.

The amending provisions of Section 16A of the Act were introduced to enable the Courts to expeditiously bring to book the offenders. Such like crimes, which are whitecollar ones, lead to deterioration in the health of the nation. Since the summary trial inherently happens to be less fair than regular trial the Legislature proceeded to provide one benefit to offenders who are tried summarily that in their case the maximum dose of sentence would not increase more than one year rigorous imprisonment, but if the offence was such that it required a dose of sentence higher than what could be awarded as a result of summary trial, the Legislature authorised the Magistrate to say so in writing and then proceed to try the offender in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, the Legislature intended that all offences under Section 16(1) of the Act be tried summarily by specially authorised Magistrates, unless such a Magistrate in writing opines that the accused deserves greater dose of sentence and so he be tried in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code.

The contention raised in this petition is that the order dated 5.2.1988 (Annexure P2) passed by the learned Magistrate whereby he ordered the trial of the case in a summary way as prescribed under Section 16A of the Act, has resulted in delay in the trial of the case and, therefore, the proceedings should be quashed. It has further been mentioned in this petition that till the passing of the order dated 5.2.1988 (Annexure P2), the accused had been tried erroneously as the mandatory provisions of Section 16A of the Act had not been followed and a wrong procedure had been adopted by the Magistrate to try the case and that benefit of the same should be given to the petitioner. I do not find any force in the submissions raised in this petition. As regards the submission that the order dated 5.2.1988 (Annexure P2) has resulted in delay in the trial of the case, the said order was challenged by way of this petition under Section 482 of the Code on 16.10.1989, i.e., after more than one year and eight months. On 18.10.1989, this Court admitted the petition for hearing and stayed further proceedings before the learned trial Court. During the trial of the case, the petitioner had also moved an application under Section 13(2) of the Act to get the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory, which also took considerable time. The case chould not proceed for about five months on account of nonappearance of Tarlochan Singh, coaccused of Siri Ram (petitioner) resulting in delay in the trial of the case. Moreover, this type of case is an offence against the society and deserves to be dealt with seriously. Nature of such like crime does not permit that on account of delay proceedings should be quashed. Therefore, there is no ground to interfere in this petition under Section 482 of the Code on account of delay. So far as the other submission raised in the petition that since the passing of the order dated 5.2.1983 (Annexure P2), the accused had been tried erroneously as the mandatory provisions of Section 16A had not been followed and that benefit of the same should be given to the petitioner, is concerned, I find no force in this submission. This by itself is not sufficient to quash the proceedings.

Consequently, I do not find any merit in this petition, which is bound to fail. I order accordingly. The trial Court is directed to expedite the trial and complete the same as early as possible, preferably within six months.