Surat Singh vs Jagdish and Others

S.C. Mittal, J.—The salient facts of the case stated in the order of reference briefly are as follows: On 15th October, 1971, a decree for Rs. 21,500 as compensation for non-performance of a contract was passed in favour of Jagdish and Jagan Nath, Defendants 1 and 2. The present suit was brought by Surat Singh for cancellation of the decree on the ground that it was obtained by fraud and collusion. The Plaintiff also prayed for perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants from executing the decree. The Plaintiff valued the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 130 only. Accordingly, Rs. 13 was affixed as court-fee. The valuation was challenged by the Defendants. The trial Court accepted their objection and directed the Plaintiff to pay ad valorem court-fee of Rs. 1953.60 on the above-said amount of Rs. 21,500. Feeling aggrieved, the Plaintiff preferred the present revision petition.

That the present suit is governed by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act has not been disputed before us. The relevant part of Section 7 dealing with the computation of fees payable in certain suits for money, reads:

(iv) in suit:

(a) for moveable property of no market value--for moveable property where the subject-matter has no market value, as, for instance, in the case of documents relating to trial;

(b) to enforce a right to share in joint family property--

to enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property;

(c) for a declaratory decree and consequential relief--to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed.

(d) * * * *

(e) * * * *

(f) * * * *

In all such suits the Plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. Provided that the minimum court-fee in each case shall be thirteen rupees.

It further deserves mention that by the Court Fees (Punjab Amendment) Act No. XXXI of 1963, the following proviso was added to Clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act:

Provided further that in suits coming under Sub-section (c), in cases where the relief sought is with reference to any property such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by Clause (v) of this section.

On behalf of the Plaintiff-Petitioner, reliance was placed on Bawa Bir Singh v. Ali Niwaz Khan AIR 1964 P&H 381 laying down that Clause (v) of Section 7 deals only with the method of calculation of value in case the suit relates to land, garden and houses and does not deal with a case of cash. The learned Judge further observed:

Argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that this proviso applies only to suits relating to property of which method of calculation of value is given in Clause (v) and not to other suits. Though it does look a bit strange that a suit seeking a declaration and consequential relief in respect of a house must necessarily be valued in accordance with the value of the property and if it relates to the same amount of cash the Plaintiff shall be at liberty to fix the amount at any figure, yet the wording of the proviso leads to no other interpretation. The learned Counsel for the Respondent could not urge any argument to the contrary. In view of the above, therefore, this proviso, which has been brought in by the amendment, has no application to the present case.

It is the soundness of this view which is before us. The learned Judge himself noticed that the interpretation of the proviso was anomalous. As observed by the learned Judge, counsel for the Respondent was unable to urge any argument to the contrary.

For finding out the true effect of the proviso in question, the history of the case law, which was not even cited before us, deserves consideration. The earliest in point is Full Bench decision in Barru and Ors. v. Lachhman and Ors. 111 PR 1913, laying down:

In suits falling u/s 7(iv)(c). Court Fees Act, the Courts are bound to accept the valuation placed by the Plaintiff upon the relief sought by him, even though such valuation is arbitrary and inadequately represents the value of the property.

That the Plaintiff can put in any arbitrary value was recognised by the Privy Council in Sunderbhai and Anr. v. Collector of Belggum and Ors. AIR 1918 P.C. 135 : ILR (43) Bom 376. Their Lordships approved the following view of the Bombay High Court:

Where a Plaintiff sues for a declaratory decree and asks for consequential relief and puts his own valuation upon that consequential relief, then for the purposes of Court Fee, and also for the purposes of jurisdiction, it is the value that the Plaintiff puts upon the plaint that determines both.

Then in Jhanda Singh and Anr. v. Bhagwan Dass AIR 1933 Lah 246, Tek Chand J., considered at length all the authorities in point starting from Barru and Ors. v. Lachhman and Ors. (supra). Reliance was also placed on Nandan Mal v. Salig Ram AIR 1922 Lah 236 and Gurdwara Mahant Jawala Singh and Ors. v. Kala Singh and Ors. AIR 1931 Lah 307. Head-note if the authirity (supra) may be quoted with advantage:

Where a suit is brought for a declaration that a decree for Rs. 2,432 odd, which had been passed against the Plaintiff ex-parte had been obtained by fraud and was not binding on him and for an injunction restraining the Defendant decree-holder from executing it, the suit is a suit to obtain a declaratory decree where consequential relief is prayed and falls u/s 7 (iv)(c), and if the Plaintiff values the suit for purposes of jurisdiction as well as for court-fees at Rs. 130, the Court has no power to review the valuation inasmuch as the Plaintiff can fix any value he likes howsoever arbitrary, fanciful or inadequate it may be.

In Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir and Ors. AIR 1949 Lah 116 (F.B.), the rulings referred to above were discussed and followed. Thereafter, in Vishwa Nath and Anr. v. Smt. Sita Bai Anand and Ors. AIR 1952 P&H 335, the question referred to the Full Bench was:

Whether the valuation for court-fee of a suit to set aside a decree where in execution of such decree property has been sold and possession given, and where recovery of possession of the property so sold is sought in. the suit, falls u/s 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-Fees Act, and if not what court-fee is payable ?

G. D. Khosla, J. (as he then was) while delivering the judgment of the Full Bench observed:

That the Plaintiff can put in any arbitrary value was recognised by the Privy Council in Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum, (supra). There are several rulings of the Lahore High Court in which the same view was expressed and a list of these rulings is given in AIR 1949 Lah. 116 , at page 119. There appears to be an established practice in Patna and Orissa that the Court can revise such arbitrary value and our attention was drawn to Udayanath Mohapatra and Another Vs. Rahas Pandiani and Others, , Salahuddin Hyder Khan and Others Vs. Dhanoo Lal Choudhary and Others, , and Rupia Mt. v. Bhatu Mahton AI.R. 1944 Pat. 17, but there appears to be no such recognised practice in this Court or in the Lahore High Court. In the circumstances I would answer the question referred to us as follows:

The valuation of court-fees of a suit to set aside a decree where in execution of such decree property has been sold and possession given and where possession of the property so sold is sought, falls u/s 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and Court-fee is payable on the value of the relief as fixed and stated by the Plaintiff.

After the decision of the Full Bench, the proviso in question to Clause (iv) (c) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act was added by Punjab Act No. XXXI of 1953. The object behind was stated as under:

In an appeal AIR 1952 P&H 335 before the Punjab High Court a question was raised recently as to the valuation of court fees of a suit to set aside a decree where in execution of such decree property has been sold and possession given, and where recovery of possession of the property so sold is sought in the suit. It was considered whether such a suit falls u/s 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, and what court-fee is payable. The High Court have held that the value of court-fee leviable in such a suit falls u/s 7(iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and not u/s 7 (v) and court-fee is payable on the value of the relief claimed for the purpose of jurisdiction. It was revealed that according to the existing Clause (iv) (c) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, this State is losing revenue on stamp duties. With a view to avoid such loss, the proposed legislative measure is introduced.

In view of the above, there remains no room for doubt that the proviso in question was enacted to demolish the ratio decidendi of not only the Full Bench decision reported in Vishwa Nath and Anr. v. Smt. Sita Bai Anand and Ors. (supra) but also of the preceding rulings supporting the view that the Plaintiff can put in any arbitrary value for the purpose of Court-fee. Besides, by applying the rule of harmonious construction, there is no escape from the conclusion that a case of cash, like the one in hand, cannot escape the sweep of the Punjab Amendment Act No. XXXI of 1953. Accordingly, the Plaintiff in the present case, as ordered by the trial Court, is required to pay ad valorem Court-fee, The view expressed by the learned Judge in Bawa Bir Singh v. Ali Niwaz Khan (supra), with due respects, has to be overruled.

In the result, the revision petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of this Court.

S. S. Sandhawalia, J.

I agree.