The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Mahendra

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This is an application for grant of leave to appeal u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("Code" for short). By the impugned judgment dated 30/4/13 passed by III Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar in Sessions Trial No. 374/10, respondent nos. 1 and 3 have been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "the Code") and respondent no. 2 of the offence u/s 376 of the IPC. However, respondent no. 2 has been convicted under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC and sentenced accordingly.

As per the prosecution story, on 28/2/10 at about 1 a.m., respondent no. 1 Mahendra, took the prosecutrix to a nearby Mandir on the pretense that she was being called by her brother Mukesh. As she reached the Mandir, she found that respondent nos. 2 and 3 viz. Halle and Ramkumar were already present there. All the respondents successfully induced the prosecutrix that respondent no. 2 was in love with her and wanted to marry her and respondent no. 2 along with other respondents, on a promise to marry, took the prosecutrix to Khurai and then to Delhi, from where respondent nos. 1 and 3 returned. After staying in Delhi for a day, he again took her to Khurai and then to Indore, where he lived with her for two months in a rented room. During this period, making her believe that she was lawfully married to him, he persistently subjected her to sexual intercourse and impregnated her. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

Learned Government Advocate, while making reference to the evidence on record, submitted that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence and the judgment of acquittal deserves to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Government Advocate, we have gone through the impugned judgment.

It was held by the trial Court in para 20 of the impugned judgment that as prosecutrix (PW 5) had not deposed anything against respondent nos. 1 and 3, therefore, no offence was made out against them. So for this purpose, arguments advanced by Shri Dhande that her age was found to be below 18 years by the learned trial Court, has no meaning.

As far as respondent no. 2 is concerned, trial Court has rightly held that alleged sexual intercourse was committed with the consent of prosecutrix, aged about 17 years.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question. The application, therefore, stands dismissed in limine.