The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Devendra Rathore @ Kallu

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This is an application for grant of leave to appeal u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("Code" for short) against acquittal of the respondent of the offences under Sections 363, 366A, 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code (for short "the IPC") and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short "the Act"). The impugned judgment dated 16/5/2013 was passed by Special Judge (under the Act) at Sehore in Special Case No. 39/2013.

As per the prosecution story, on 6/3/13, complainant Laxman lodged a missing report no. 13/2013 at Police Station Ashta regarding his daughter viz. the prosecutrix, aged about 14 years belonging to scheduled caste. During investigation and interrogation of the prosecutrix, she divulged that Kalla alias Devendra Rathore, on a promise to marry, took her to Dewas, where he kept her in a hotel room for two days and had subjected her to rape. Crime No. 153/13 was registered at Police Station Ashta. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

Learned Government Advocate, while making reference to the evidence on record, submitted that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence and the judgment of acquittal deserves to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Government Advocate, we have gone through the impugned judgment.

On proper appreciation of evidence on record, trial Court held in paragraph 15 of the impugned judgment that, no evidence was led by the prosecution, to prove that on what basis the entry in regard to date of birth of the prosecutrix was made in the School Admission Register, therefore, date of birth mentioned in the school record was not found reliable. In para 16, it was held that as per the report of Medical Board, District Hospital, Sehore dated 13/4/13, age of prosecutrix was found to be 18 years, meaning thereby, that the prosecutrix was major on the date of incident.

In para 22 of the judgment, it was also held by the trial Court that it was admitted by prosecutrix in para 3 of her evidence that she was residing with the respondent in the house of his sister at Dewas for 3 months. Thereafter, she came to Ashta with a friend of respondent. The respondent on a promise of marriage had committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix and according to the prosecutrix, she was acquainted with the respondent for the last 11/2 years and was in love with him and also wanted to marry him.

On the aforesaid premises, learned trial Court rightly held that prosecutrix was a major and was a consenting party.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question. The application, therefore, stands dismissed in limine.