Rifat Qadir vs State of J&K

Mr. Dhiraj Singh Thakur, J.—Petitioner responded to the advertisement notice dated 12.10.1995 issued by Service Selection Board for

appointment of Teachers in District Baramulla. The selection got concluded and 601 candidates were selected. The selection was challenged in

SWP No. 946-1025/1997 titled Kulsum Shafi and ors v. State & ors. wherein petitioner also figured at serial No. 4. The dispute finally

reached a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 237/1997 where the Division Bench was pleased to order that 37 vacancies which remained

unfilled be offered to the available selected candidates from out of the selection list/waiting list. It is urged that the petitioner figured at serial No. 58

in the waiting list. Case of the petitioner is that whereas respondents were supposed to adjust 37 candidates but only 13 were appointed in piece

meals without any cause or justification. Finally, it is urged that a representation was filed by the petitioner before Director School Education

wherein she sought information vis-a-vis appointments made pursuant to the directions dated 20th October, 1997 and after obtaining said

information the present writ petition has been filed.

On the face of it petition appears to be barred by delay and laches. Whereas directions issued by a Division Bench of this Court were passed

on 20th October, 1997, the petitioner took no discernible or active role in ensuring that the said directions are implemented in letter and spirit.

Applying for information under Right to Information Act from the office of respondents does not in any manner help the petitioner in her effort to

get the laches condoned.

In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra & ors, (1974) 1 SCC 317, the Apex court held that there was no inviolable

rule whenever there was delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition under Article 226. The question was one of discretion to

be exercised in the facts and circumstances of each case. Delay and laches was not a rule of law but a rule of practise based on sound and proper

exercise of discretion.

Another principle that was laid down by the Apex Court and followed in R & M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group &

ors, (2005) 3 SCC 91 was that delay would be an important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution, if the same had resulted in creation of third party interest.

The third principle as regards delay and laches can be noticed in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P v. Bhailal Bhai,

AIR 1964 SC 1006, which stated that the maximum period fixed by the legislature for grant of relief in a civil suit would ordinarily be reasonable

standard for fixing the period to determine delay in seeking remedy under Article 226. The Apex court observed in the said case as under:

The provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. However, the maximum period fixed by the

legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which

delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of

limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to

hold that it is unreasonable.

However, it does not lay down, as a matter of principle, that in every case, where a petition is filed within the period, which is otherwise

prescribed for filing a civil suit for a particular relief, the court must, as a matter of rule, accept the petition and exercise jurisdiction under Article

Reference in this regard can be made to the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airports Authority of India, AIR 1979

SC 1628, where even five months delay was considered to be fatal. The Apex Court in the said judgment observed as follows:

Moreover, the writ petition was filed by the appellant more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of respondent 4 and during this

period, Respondent 4 incurred considerable expenditure aggregating to about Rs 1,25,000 in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant

and the snack bars and in fact set up the snack bars and started running the same. It would now be most iniquitous to set aside the contracts of

Respondent 4 at the instance of the appellant. The position would have been different if the appellant had filed the writ petition immediately after

the acceptance of the tender of Respondent 4 but the appellant allowed a period of over five months to elapse during which Respondent 4 altered

their position. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not a fit case in which we should interfere and grant relief to the appellant in the exercise of

our discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Similar was the view taken by the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Mishra v. Collector, Raipur, AIR 1980 SC 112.

Testing the facts of the present case on the touchstone of the judgments aforementioned, it is clear that the process of selection was initiated as

far back as in the year 1995 and directions were finally issued by a Division Bench of this Court in the year 1997. If at all there was any omission

on the part of respondents to strictly implement the judgment and order in its letter and spirit, an appropriate remedy ought to have been availed

within a reasonable time. Approaching this Court in the year 2010 through the medium of present writ petition seeking directions against the

respondents for appointment of the petitioner against one of the vacancies out of 37 ordered to be filled up as per directions of the Division Bench

is, therefore, clearly belated.

For the reasons mentioned here-in-above, the petition being barred by delay and laches, is dismissed without any order as to costs.