The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Sagar Patidar

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This is an application for grant of leave to appeal u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("Code" for short) against the acquittal the respondent namely Sagar Patidar of the offences punishable under Sections 450, 376(1), 506 Part II of the Indian Penal Code (for short "the IPC") and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for brevity "the Act"). The impugned judgment dated 31/5/2013 was passed by Special Judge (under the Act), Sehore, in Special Case No. 9/13.

As per the prosecution story, on 25/8/12, at about 10.30 p.m., the respondent trespassed into the house of the prosecutrix, a member of scheduled caste and subjected her to rape, and also threatened to kill her. First Information Report (Ex. P/9) was registered and after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the respondent.

Learned Government Advocate, while making reference to the evidence on record, submitted that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence and the judgment of acquittal deserves to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties, we have gone through the impugned judgment and statements of the witnesses produced by the appellant during the course of arguments.

As per Dr. Madhvi (PW 1), she had not found any injury on the private part of the prosecutrix, aged 25 years. Learned trial Court, after going through the evidence of the prosecutrix (PW 8), has also held that she was a consenting party. It was also held that the prosecutrix and her family members used to work as labourers for the respondent, though this fact was denied by the prosecutrix. Trial Court further, in paragraph 36 has held that there was a possibility of false implication in view of the fact that Jeevan Singh (PW 9), husband of the prosecutrix, was not inclined to repay the dues of the respondent.

On perusal of the impugned judgment together with the statements of the witnesses, we agree with the view taken by the trial Court.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question. The application, therefore, stands dismissed in limine.