High CourtsSingle Bench

The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Mohd. Shaqil

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 20 September 2013 · Citation: (2013) 09 MP CK 0300

HON’BLE JUDGES
B.D. Rathi, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378(3) · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 363, 366, 376(1), 384 · Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3(2)(v)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
M. Cr. C. No. 5863 of 2013
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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 611 words

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This application for grant of leave to appeal has been preferred u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 20/3/2013 passed by Special Judge (under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short "the Act")), Sehore, in Special Case No. 34/2010, whereby respondent no. 1 Mohd. Shakeel has been acquitted of the offences under Sections 366, 376(1) and 384 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "the IPC"), respondent nos. 2 and 3 Manish Kumar and Ketan Soni of the offences under Sections 366 and 384 of the IPC and respondent nos. 4 and 5 namely Brijkishore and Vijay have been acquitted of the offence u/s 363 of the IPC and all of them have also been acquitted of the offence u/s 3(2)(v) of the Act.

2.

Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 1/5/10 at about 12 a.m., respondents kidnapped the prosecutrix, a member of scheduled caste, from the Village Neelkachhar within the territorial jurisdiction of Police Station Rehti, District Sehore, for the purpose of extortion and respondent no. 1 also subjected her to rape. Missing person report 11/10 was lodged by her father Ramadhar and entered in Roznamacha Sanha No. 66 on 2/5/2010 and on that basis Crime No. 94/10 (Ex. P/6) was registered and after investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

3.

Learned Government Advocate submitted that the impugned judgment was passed without proper appreciation of evidence on record and the same deserved to be interfered with.

4.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Government Advocate, impugned judgment and record of the trial Court were perused.

5.

Admittedly, prosecutrix, an educated lady, was more than 22 years of age on the date of incident. Prosecutrix (PW1) had admitted in her evidence that when she was studying at Bhopal, respondent befriended her and every now and then, they used to talk with each other. Trial Court found that she had extensively travelled with respondent no. 1 to Pitampur, Vidisha and Indore at her own accord and had not raised any objection despite having sufficient opportunity. As per her version, at Vidisha she had lived in a room for the whole day with one lady, but she did not narrate the incident to her. Trial Court also found that it could not be a coincidence that when respondents reached before the house of prosecutrix, then at the same time she came out for answering the call of nature and the said conduct reflected pre-planning and upon being asked by respondent no. 1 to bring ornaments, she went inside the house and without informing her parents, voluntarily brought the same. Dr. Sandhya Morya (PW6), testified, that prosecutrix was habitual of sexual intercourse and no definite opinion was given by her as to rape. In the aforesaid premises, the trial Court held that prosecutrix was a consenting party and that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

6.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court.

7.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

8.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the judgment of acquittal in question. The application, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.