The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Baijnath

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This is an application for grant of leave to appeal u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("Code" for short) against acquittal of the respondent of the offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code (for short "the IPC") and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short "the Act"). The impugned judgment dated 21/7/2011 was passed by Special Judge (under the Act) at Tikamgarh in Special Sessions Case No. 5/08.

As per the prosecution story, on 13/4/07, when the prosecutrix, a member of scheduled caste, was going to the house of her maternal uncle after appearing in Class VIIth examination, the respondent after threatening to kill her parents and administering her stupefying substance, took her to various places viz. Jhansi, Ambala and Delhi and for a period of about six months persistently subjected her to rape.

Learned Government Advocate, while making reference to the evidence on record, submitted that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence and the judgment of acquittal deserves to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Government Advocate, we have gone through the impugned judgment.

It was held by the trial Court that as per the ossification report, prosecutrix was a major. It was also held by the trial Court that the prosecutrix extensively travelled with the respondent to various places viz. Delhi, Jhansi and Ambala, and the entire duration of her stay with the respondent was of more than six months. The prosecutrix had also worked as a labourer with the respondent. It is an admitted fact that 6-7 months prior to the incident, prosecutrix was married to one Ramdas Chadar and, at that time, she was 18 years of age and, over some dispute, she had deserted him. This conduct of the prosecutrix, itself reveals, that she was a consenting party and was accompanying the respondent on her own accord.

On perusal of the impugned judgment together with the statements of the witnesses, we agree with the view taken by the trial Court.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question. The application, therefore, stands dismissed in limine.