The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Rakesh Kumar

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This is an application for grant of leave to appeal u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("Code" for short) against acquittal of all the respondents of the offences under Sections 376(2)(g) and 506B of the Indian Penal Code (for short "the IPC"), as well as acquittal of respondent nos. 1 and 3 of the offence u/s 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short "the Act") and acquittal of respondent no. 1 of the offences under Sections 494 and 323 of the IPC. The impugned judgment dated 22/2/2012 was passed by Special Judge (under the Act) at Mandla in Special Sessions Trial No. 20/2011.

As per the prosecution story, concealing the fact that he was already married and making the prosecutrix believe that she was lawfully married to him, respondent no. 1 Rakesh persistently subjected her to sexual intercourse and impregnated her. Besides this, his friends viz. respondent nos. 2 and 3 also subjected her to rape at his instance only. Not only this, he also assaulted the prosecutrix causing injuries on her left wrist.

Learned Government Advocate, while making reference to the evidence on record, submitted that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence and the judgment of acquittal deserves to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Government Advocate, we have gone through the evidence on record.

On proper appreciation of evidence on record, trial Court held that prosecutrix was a married woman and without divorce was living separately from her husband Narayan Prasad and during that period, she had developed illicit relations with respondent no. 1. He never promised her for marriage. It was also held by the trial Court that prosecution has failed to produce any evidence with regard to gang rape. Moreover, the testimony of prosecutrix is shaky and also does not inspire confidence. Offence was not committed because of the fact that prosecutrix belonged to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. Looking to the facts and evidence brought on record by the prosecution, in our considered view, no offence is made out against the respondents.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question. The application, therefore, stands dismissed in limine.